The Competition of Global Powers in Africa
The Competition of Global Powers in Africa
Africa's Rising Influence
The 21st century finds Africa increasingly central to global dynamics, no longer a periphery but a continent whose trajectory profoundly influences international affairs. Its demographic weight is undeniable; by 2035, Africa is projected to host a quarter of the world's working-age population. Economically, the potential is vast, exemplified by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which, once fully implemented, could unite over 1.2 billion people into the world's fifth-largest economy with a combined GDP exceeding $3.4 trillion. Geopolitically, the continent holds significant sway, representing the largest and often most unified voting bloc within the UN General Assembly and holding three non-permanent seats on the Security Council. This rising influence has not gone unnoticed, transforming Africa into what some observers term the "epicenter of a new geopolitical order," a focal point for intensifying international engagement.
However, it is crucial to avoid generalizations. Africa is not a monolithic entity; it comprises diverse political regions, each with distinct histories, challenges, and opportunities, following diverging trajectories shaped by unique economic and security dynamics. This internal diversity interacts complexly with the growing external interest.
External Powers in Africa
Africa has become a stage for renewed and intensified competition among global powers, primarily the United States, China, and Russia. This rivalry has moved beyond purely economic interests to encompass broader geo-strategic considerations. Alongside these major players, a diverse array of other nations actively pursue their interests on the continent, including traditional European powers like France and Germany, the post-Brexit United Kingdom, and increasingly influential actors such as India, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan. This crowded field creates a complex, multipolar dynamic, offering African nations potential leverage but also exposing them to fragmented and sometimes contradictory external pressures.
The framing of Africa merely as an "arena" for great power competition, however, risks obscuring the continent's own agency. While external rivalries undoubtedly shape events, African nations are not passive recipients of foreign influence. They actively navigate these complex relationships, seeking to balance external powers, leverage competition for their own benefit, and pursue independent foreign policy agendas. The African Union's attempts at non-alignment, for instance regarding the conflict in Ukraine, underscore this pursuit of agency on the global stage, even amidst internal divisions. The diverse approaches of external actors – spanning economic investment, security partnerships, diplomatic initiatives, and cultural outreach – further complicate the landscape, providing African states with a wider range of potential partners but also demanding sophisticated diplomatic maneuvering to manage the inherent complexities and potential negative spillovers.
This report delves into the evolving strategies, motivations, and impacts of these key external powers in Africa. It examines the intricate interplay of economic interests, security concerns, geopolitical rivalries, and the crucial, often underestimated, role of African agency in navigating these global crosscurrents. It argues that while external actors pursue distinct goals – ranging from partnership and development to resource extraction and disruption – their interactions collectively create both significant opportunities and formidable challenges for Africa's development, stability, and quest for greater autonomy in an increasingly interconnected world.
The United States in Africa
United States policy toward Africa has undergone significant evolution since the end of the Cold War, moving from a period of perceived hegemony and established priorities to a contemporary phase marked by explicit great power competition and attempts to revitalize partnerships.
Post-Cold War Foundations and Key Initiatives
Following the Cold War, US engagement with Africa coalesced around four traditional pillars: the promotion of democracy and good governance; advancing peace and security; fostering trade and investment; and supporting development. There was initial optimism that Africa could become a showcase for democratic progress. Several cornerstone initiatives defined this era:
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Enacted in 2000, AGOA became the bedrock of US-Africa trade relations, offering duty-free access to the US market for thousands of products from eligible sub-Saharan African countries. Eligibility hinges on progress in areas like rule of law, human rights, and economic reforms. While its impact has been uneven, AGOA is credited with boosting non-oil exports, particularly in the apparel sector (which grew 64% from 2010-2020), creating jobs (sustaining an estimated 1.3 million African jobs and linked to 450,000 US jobs), and incentivizing reforms. Non-oil imports under AGOA reached a record $5.7 billion in 2022, quadruple the 2001 level, and total AGOA imports were $9.7 billion in 2023. Despite mixed results, it remains a vital program for many African economies and US businesses investing there.
The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): Launched in 2003, PEPFAR is widely regarded as an "unmitigated success," saving millions of lives across Africa. It supports over 325,000 health workers in the region, strengthening health systems not only for HIV/AIDS but also for responding to other disease outbreaks.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC): Established in 2004, the MCC provides large-scale grants to countries meeting rigorous governance and economic freedom criteria. Recent commitments include over $1.6 billion for food security initiatives and programs like Nanatech in Togo, aimed at equipping women entrepreneurs with digital skills.
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM): Officially launched in 2008, AFRICOM consolidated US military activities across the continent (except Egypt) under one command, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. Its mission focuses on countering transnational threats, strengthening partner security forces, and responding to crises through sustained security engagement and military-to-military activities. AFRICOM emphasizes a partner-centric approach, often described as "African-led, U.S.-enabled", and works closely with US diplomatic and development agencies. Key activities include major exercises like Flintlock and African Lion, and security cooperation programs such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Africa Partnership Station. Despite its focus on partnership, AFRICOM initially faced resistance and suspicion from some African nations concerned about foreign interference.
Policy Stagnation and Critiques
Despite these significant initiatives, US policy toward Africa faced criticism in the 2010s for becoming stagnant and failing to adapt to the continent's growing dynamism and influence. Analysts argued that policy was "mired in old thinking," "locked in amber," and hampered by low prioritization within the US foreign policy establishment. This perceived "policy drift" often treated Africa as a "region apart," divorced from global trends, leaving the US ill-equipped for new challenges like pandemics or intensifying geopolitical competition. The pursuit of longstanding goals became unfocused and anachronistic, failing to keep pace with Africa's shifting demographics and increasing weight on the world stage.
Contemporary Strategy: Competition and Revitalized Partnership
The Biden-Harris administration marked a shift, explicitly acknowledging the need to address great power competition (GPC) with China and Russia in Africa. The 2022 U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa aimed to revitalize relationships, transforming them into stronger partnerships. Its core objectives focus on fostering openness and democratic societies, delivering democratic and security dividends, advancing pandemic recovery and economic opportunity, and supporting conservation and climate adaptation.
Key initiatives under this renewed focus include:
Prosper Africa: This initiative aims to substantially increase two-way trade and investment. The 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit showcased $15.7 billion in new deals, and since the start of the administration, Prosper Africa has supported the closure of nearly 1,700 deals valued at over $63 billion across 41 African countries. Specific programs include the Catalytic Investment Facility to mobilize private capital for African tech startups and grants to entities like the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility (LSF).
Power Africa: Continues efforts to improve access to electricity.
Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA): A signature initiative to expand digital access, literacy, and enabling environments across the continent.
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI): The US-led G7+ response aiming to mobilize $600 billion by 2027 for high-standard, values-driven infrastructure projects globally, with Africa as a key focus, positioning itself as an alternative model to China's BRI.
The 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit: This major diplomatic event signaled a renewed high-level commitment, pledging $55 billion in investment over three years (with over $65 billion reportedly committed or spent two years later). It was followed by numerous high-level US official visits to the continent.
AFRICOM's posture also adapted, maintaining its focus on counter-terrorism (e.g., supporting Somali National Army against al-Shabaab), capacity building, and countering malign actors. However, facing setbacks in the Sahel, AFRICOM began pivoting towards strengthening partnerships with "likeminded countries with democratic values" in coastal West Africa, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Benin.
Challenges and the "Policy Trilemma"
A significant challenge confronting contemporary US Africa policy is the inherent tension between its core objectives, often termed the "Africa policy trilemma". This refers to the difficulty of simultaneously promoting democracy, combating violent extremism (terrorism), and engaging in great-power competition. Prioritizing one objective can often undermine progress in the others. For instance, supporting non-democratic regimes or military juntas because they are deemed necessary partners for counter-terrorism or countering rivals like Russia directly conflicts with the goal of democracy promotion. Conversely, imposing sanctions or cutting aid to coup leaders to uphold democratic principles can jeopardize security partnerships, potentially pushing those regimes towards competitors.
The recent "epidemic" of coups, particularly in the Sahel, has starkly exposed these weaknesses and the lack of a coherent, coordinated strategy among the US and its allies to defend democracy without sacrificing security interests or geopolitical influence. Years of counter-terrorism work and strategic partnerships risk being undone as new leaders become less willing to host Western forces.
This internal contradiction weakens policy coherence. While US policy rhetoric emphasizes shared values and democracy promotion, which resonates with African public opinion that largely favors democracy, the practical application is often perceived as inconsistent. Some African partners prioritize immediate security needs over governance reforms, while others resent what they see as Western hypocrisy or lecturing, particularly given historical contexts. To remain influential, the US must move beyond moralistic arguments, employ tangible incentives and disincentives, and adapt its strategies beyond traditional donor-recipient frameworks to reflect a more equal partnership.
Despite significant historical investments and widely recognized programs like AGOA and PEPFAR, US influence faces challenges not only from strategic rivals but also from a lingering perception that its policies have been "stale," "anachronistic," and have failed to fully grasp African priorities or treat the continent as a strategic equal. The recent emphasis on high-level engagement, partnership rhetoric, and initiatives like the 2022 Summit represents a concerted effort to counteract this perception and adapt to the new realities of a multipolar Africa. Success will depend on effectively navigating the policy trilemma and demonstrating consistent, strategically coherent engagement that aligns with both US interests and African aspirations.
China in Africa
China's engagement with Africa has transformed dramatically over the past few decades, shifting from ideological support during the Cold War to becoming the continent's most significant economic partner, primarily through trade and large-scale infrastructure investment under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Historical Context and Evolution
China's ties with Africa date back to the Cold War era, where Beijing supported various African liberation movements. Following the Chinese civil war, Africa became crucial to PRC foreign policy, marked by consistent high-level diplomatic visits. After the Cold War, a key focus was isolating Taiwan diplomatically, successfully persuading most African nations to switch recognition to the PRC, with Eswatini being the sole exception by 2023. The launch of the "Going Out" strategy in 1999 marked a turning point, encouraging Chinese companies to invest overseas and initiating a new wave of economic engagement in Africa. This engagement accelerated significantly after China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Africa
Launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, the BRI is a cornerstone of his "major-country diplomacy," aiming to project China's global leadership. In Africa, it initially envisioned reinvigorating ancient trade routes, particularly along the East African coast. However, widespread interest from across the continent led to a rapid expansion in scope. The BRI became synonymous with massive infrastructure projects – ports, railways, roads, power plants, hospitals, stadiums – largely financed by Chinese loans. Notable examples include the Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya, the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, dams and airports in Zambia, and the Nacala Port development in Mozambique.
The motivations behind BRI are multifaceted: opening new markets for Chinese goods and construction firms, exporting surplus industrial capacity, securing access to Africa's vast natural resources, strengthening diplomatic ties with partner countries, and generating demand for Chinese expertise and equipment through project financing. The initiative is framed flexibly, allowing adaptation, such as the addition of a "Health Silk Road" during the COVID-19 pandemic. World Bank studies estimated BRI could significantly boost trade flows and GDP for participating countries.
Trade, Investment, and Lending Dynamics
China rapidly became Africa's largest trading partner. Bilateral trade surged from just $10.6 billion in 2000 to $204.19 billion by 2018. Chinese investment, particularly state-led financing for infrastructure, peaked around 2016. Often, these investments were linked to resource access, such as oil-for-infrastructure deals in post-civil war Angola.
This period saw an enormous increase in Chinese lending to African governments. Estimates suggest Chinese state and commercial loans amounted to $132 billion between 2006 and 2017. By 2020, Chinese lenders accounted for approximately 12% of Africa's total public and private external debt stock of $696 billion, making China the continent's largest single bilateral creditor.
However, this lending boom slowed dramatically after 2016. New loan commitments to African governments plummeted from a peak of $28.4 billion in 2016 to $8.2 billion in 2019, and further to just $1.9 billion in 2020 (partly due to the pandemic). This decline is attributed to several factors: shifting priorities within China's domestic economy, growing concerns about the debt sustainability of African borrowers and their ability to repay, and a slowdown in African commodity prices and GDP growth rates. This shift represents a significant recalibration in China's economic engagement, moving away from the massive state-led lending of the previous decade. While not necessarily a withdrawal, this change impacts the availability of large-scale finance for African nations and potentially opens space for other partners or more diversified forms of Chinese engagement, perhaps with a greater focus on the private sector or initiatives like the Health Silk Road.
The Debt Sustainability Debate
The scale of Chinese lending fueled intense debate about "debt-trap diplomacy." Critics, particularly in the West, accused Beijing of deliberately luring developing countries into unsustainable debt to gain strategic leverage, seize assets (like ports or mines) upon default, and expand its geopolitical or military reach. China vehemently rejects this narrative, portraying its lending as mutually beneficial South-South cooperation between developing nations, adhering to a principle of non-interference in domestic politics – a stance contrasted with perceived Western conditionality.
Several analyses have challenged the simplistic "debt trap" narrative. Research from institutions like Chatham House points out that BRI projects were often poorly coordinated, contradicting the idea of a centrally planned debt strategy. Furthermore, African debt distress often involves multiple creditors and factors beyond Chinese loans, including mismanagement by borrower governments. Attributing distress solely to China minimizes the agency of African actors in negotiating and managing these loans.
Nevertheless, the concerns persist. The opacity surrounding the terms and scale of some Chinese loans, coupled with China's clear strategic interests in Africa, means the possibility of debt being used for leverage cannot be entirely dismissed. China now faces the complex challenge of managing its large debt stock across Africa amid economic difficulties, balancing repayment demands with maintaining its image as a friend to developing nations.
The reality of debt distress is acute for several African nations. By late 2022, numerous countries were deemed by the IMF/World Bank to be in or at high risk of debt distress. In countries like Djibouti, Angola, the Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zambia, Chinese loans constitute a significant portion (often over 25-50%) of their external public debt. Zambia remains in debt distress despite ongoing restructuring efforts. Djibouti accumulated significant arrears, primarily to China's Exim Bank, after halting debt service payments linked to large infrastructure loans. Resolving these situations requires the cooperation of all creditors, and given its significant exposure, China's participation is crucial for the success of multilateral debt relief initiatives like the G20 Common Framework, even if its lending practices differ from those of traditional Paris Club creditors or multilateral institutions. This positions China as a key, unavoidable player in Africa's financial stability, deeply intertwined with geopolitical considerations.
Beyond Economics: Political and Soft Power
China's engagement extends beyond economics. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains relations with 110 political parties across 51 African countries, and China's National People's Congress has formal ties with 35 African parliaments. Soft power initiatives include Confucius Institutes promoting language and culture, numerous scholarships for African students to study in China, media engagement, and training programs. Defence ties have also deepened, with an expanded network of defence attachés and a significant increase in arms sales between 2012 and 2017, although recent data suggests China might be increasing sales as Russia's decline. There is also speculation about China seeking military base locations beyond its existing facility in Djibouti. While Chinese investment has delivered much-needed infrastructure, criticism persists regarding the lack of local job creation and skills transfer on some projects, with many positions reserved for Chinese workers.
Russia in Africa
After a period of diminished influence following the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia under President Vladimir Putin has made a concerted effort to re-engage with Africa, leveraging historical ties, security expertise, and anti-Western sentiment to carve out a distinct, albeit disruptive, role on the continent.
Renewed Focus and Motivations
Russia's return to Africa is driven by a confluence of strategic objectives. Moscow seeks to challenge Western influence, particularly that of the US and former colonial powers like France, often at a relatively low political and economic cost. It aims to cultivate financial and economic ties with African nations that operate outside the US dollar system, partly as a means to evade Western sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia views Africa as a crucial arena for projecting its status as a global power, expanding its military footprint (especially near NATO's southern flank), securing access to valuable natural resources (minerals, energy), gaining diplomatic support in international forums like the UN, and demonstrating its ability to shape global events. While Africa historically held a low priority in official Russian strategic documents, its practical importance has grown significantly in the context of Russia's increasing international isolation.
Diplomatic and Narrative Outreach
Russia has pursued its objectives through intensified diplomatic engagement, marked by frequent high-level visits, such as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's tours across the continent. The Russia-Africa Summits, held in Sochi in 2019 and St. Petersburg in 2023, serve as key platforms for consolidating ties with African leaders. Moscow demonstrated considerable determination to hold the 2023 summit despite the ongoing war in Ukraine and Western sanctions, viewing it as vital for countering diplomatic isolation.
A central element of Russia's approach involves leveraging historical narratives, particularly Soviet-era support for anti-colonial movements and ruling parties like South Africa's ANC. Moscow actively promotes anti-Western and anti-colonial sentiments, contrasting perceived Western interference, hypocrisy, and historical exploitation with its own purported respect for sovereignty and non-interference. State-controlled media outlets like RT and Sputnik broadcast widely in Africa, disseminating narratives critical of the West and supportive of Russian foreign policy aims. This messaging often resonates in countries experiencing frustration with Western partners or facing internal instability. The complex voting patterns of African nations at the UN regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine (with 17 abstaining from the initial condemnation vote) reflect this nuanced landscape, indicating a desire for non-alignment or dissatisfaction with Western pressure, rather than outright support for Moscow's actions in many cases.
The Security Nexus: Arms, Agreements, and Proxies
Military and security cooperation forms the "core" of Russia's influence strategy in Africa.
Arms Sales: Russia remains a major arms supplier to the continent, although some reports suggest its market share may be declining relative to competitors like China. Key clients include long-standing partners like Algeria and Egypt, but also newer customers such as Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Cameroon. Russian weaponry is often perceived as cheaper than Western alternatives and, crucially, is supplied without conditions related to democracy or human rights. This allows Russia to step in when Western nations cut or restrict security assistance due to concerns over governance or abuses, as seen in cases like Sudan, Cameroon, and Ethiopia.
Military Cooperation Agreements: Moscow has signed bilateral military or military-technical cooperation agreements with a large number of African states – estimates range from over 30 to 43 countries. These agreements provide frameworks for arms transfers, military training, technical support, and intelligence sharing. Recent agreements with countries like Nigeria underscore that even significant Western security partners engage with Russia.
Military Basing: Building on a Soviet-era presence in North Africa and the Horn, Russia actively seeks new military basing opportunities to project power, particularly along strategic maritime corridors. Reports have cited Russian interest in establishing bases or securing access agreements in Egypt, CAR, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Sudan, with a potential naval base at Port Sudan being a key objective.
The Wagner Group / Africa Corps: Exploiting Instability
Perhaps the most controversial and defining feature of Russia's recent engagement is the use of private military companies (PMCs), most notably the Wagner Group, now largely rebranded as the Africa Corps following the death of its founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. Wagner operated in a legal and operational "grey zone," providing deniability for Moscow while acting as a key tool of Russian foreign policy.
Wagner specialized in offering "regime survival packages" to fragile states and embattled leaders, providing direct military support, training, and political protection. This support, however, often came at a steep price, frequently paid through lucrative concessions for natural resources like gold, diamonds, and timber, effectively allowing Wagner and, by extension, Russia to exploit the host nation's wealth. Wagner's typical targets were states possessing significant resource wealth but suffering from weak governance and instability.
Wagner/Africa Corps operations have been documented across several African countries, often with devastating consequences for civilians:
Central African Republic (CAR): Deployed to support President Touadéra against rebel groups, Wagner forces became deeply involved in the mining sector. Numerous reports from the UN, human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International), and journalists document widespread abuses, including summary executions, torture, rape and sexual violence, indiscriminate killings, harassment of civilians, peacekeepers, and aid workers, and the razing of entire villages to secure mining areas.
Mali: Following military coups in 2020 and 2021 and the subsequent breakdown of relations with France, Mali's junta turned to Wagner for security support, reportedly paying $10 million per month. Wagner forces replaced French troops and have been implicated alongside Malian forces in numerous atrocities. These include the Moura massacre in March 2022, where hundreds of civilians were allegedly executed, as well as other summary killings, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual violence, and indiscriminate drone strikes killing civilians, including during a wedding and a burial. ACLED data indicates a dramatic surge in violence against civilians following Wagner's arrival.
Sudan: Wagner provided support to elements within the Sudanese military and security apparatus, particularly the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Its activities focused on securing access to Sudan's rich gold reserves, reportedly raiding artisanal mines along the border with CAR, killing dozens of miners, and smuggling gold to help finance Russia's war effort in Ukraine and circumvent sanctions. Wagner's involvement is seen as contributing to the country's instability and undermining democratic transitions.
Libya: Wagner forces intervened significantly in the Libyan civil war, supporting General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) against the UN-recognized government. They provided mercenaries, training, and advanced military equipment, including fighter jets disguised to hide their Russian origin. Wagner units were accused of planting landmines and booby traps in civilian areas during their withdrawal from Tripoli, causing hundreds of casualties, actions the UN Fact-Finding Mission suggested may constitute war crimes.
Other Countries: Wagner's presence or activities have also been reported in Mozambique, Syria (often as a testing ground or parallel operation), and potentially up to 16-30 countries across Africa and the Middle East, involving varying levels of engagement from resource guarding to direct combat and political interference.
Alongside direct violence, Russia and its proxies employ sophisticated disinformation campaigns across Africa. Using state media, social media troll farms, pseudo-think tanks, and funding local outlets (as reported in Libya), they spread anti-Western (especially anti-French) narratives, promote pro-Russian views, attempt to justify Wagner's presence, and interfere in political processes to bolster Moscow's allies.
Post-Prigozhin Evolution: Consolidation or Weakening?
Prigozhin's failed mutiny in June 2023 and subsequent death in August 2023 marked a turning point. The mutiny exposed the Kremlin's reliance on Wagner and the risks inherent in its semi-autonomous status. Following Prigozhin's demise, Moscow moved to assert greater state control over the network, reportedly placing operations under the purview of Russian military intelligence (GRU) and rebranding the African contingent as the "Africa Corps".
This transition represents an attempt by the Kremlin to consolidate control over these strategically important and often lucrative proxy operations, reducing the risk of rogue actions while ensuring closer alignment with state objectives. While the Africa Corps appears to retain many of Wagner's core military, political, and economic goals and employs similar strategies, the loss of Prigozhin's unique entrepreneurial and operational skills may impact effectiveness. However, the move towards direct state control makes Russia's involvement less deniable, potentially increasing international scrutiny. Despite Wagner's brutal track record and the turmoil surrounding its leadership, Russia's appeal as a security partner in certain African contexts appears largely intact, particularly among regimes prioritizing survival over democratic norms or seeking alternatives to Western engagement. Residual elements of the original Wagner structure also continue to operate.
Ultimately, Russia's engagement model in Africa remains heavily predicated on exploiting instability, leveraging anti-Western sentiment, and providing security guarantees – often through brutal proxies – primarily to fragile, resource-rich states, in exchange for geopolitical influence and economic gain. This approach offers Moscow a relatively low-cost means of projecting power and disrupting rivals but carries significant risks of exacerbating conflict, enabling human rights atrocities, and facilitating kleptocratic resource extraction.
Other Powers in Africa
Beyond the prominent roles of the United States, China, and Russia, Africa's international relations are shaped by a wide array of other external powers, each with distinct histories, priorities, and approaches. This diverse engagement further complicates the geopolitical landscape, offering African nations more options but also presenting a complex web of influences.
European Stalwarts: Adjusting Roles
France: France's relationship with Africa, particularly Francophone Africa, is deeply rooted in colonial history and has undergone tumultuous changes. Historically acting as the continent's "gendarme" and later as a key security provider in the Sahel against jihadism (Operations Serval and Barkhane, EU missions like Takuba), France's military presence has recently unraveled. Disagreements with military juntas that seized power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger over the roots of conflict, war strategy, and governance, coupled with rising anti-French sentiment fueled by perceived intervention failures and sophisticated disinformation campaigns, led to demands for the withdrawal of French and associated European forces. President Macron has attempted to pivot towards a relationship based on "mutual respect," focusing on civil society, youth, and addressing historical grievances. However, persistent issues like the controversial CFA franc currency, restrictive visa policies, and the suspension of aid to junta-led countries continue to strain relations. Paris is also facing pressure to close its remaining permanent military bases in countries like Chad, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Gabon, which are increasingly seen as political liabilities. Economically, France's trade is shifting, with major partners like Nigeria and South Africa now eclipsing traditional partners in the West African Economic and Monetary Union. France collaborates with Germany on coordinating Africa policies. The withdrawal or repositioning of France, particularly its security role in the Sahel, has created significant vacuums that actors like Russia have readily exploited, fundamentally altering regional dynamics.
United Kingdom: Post-Brexit, the UK aims to forge an independent "Global Britain" identity, often highlighting ties with the 19 African Commonwealth nations. However, UK-Africa trade has been on a downward trajectory, falling from a peak of $43 billion in 2012 to just $14 billion in 2020, despite trade agreements with 16 African countries. Trade remains concentrated with a few partners like South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya. UK foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Africa was substantial ($66 billion in 2019), but heavily skewed towards extractive industries (oil, gas, mining) and financial services (nearly 83%), with minimal investment in manufacturing or technology sectors. A major policy shift impacting relations is the significant cut to the UK's Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget, with bilateral aid to Africa reportedly slashed by 66% in 2021. This reduction, coupled with a reprioritization towards climate change over poverty reduction, could profoundly affect African countries, which received over half of the UK's region-specific bilateral aid. The UK also maintains a military presence through training and peacekeeping support and seeks alignment from African partners in the context of great power competition.
Germany: Germany's Africa policy emphasizes long-term economic development, poverty reduction, health, rule of law, and peace. Implementation is largely guided by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and its agency, GIZ. A key feature is close alignment and cooperation with the African Union (AU) and its member states' goals, supporting African representation in multilateral forums. Germany promotes a "feminist development policy" and seeks to address colonial legacies. Research institutions like the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies play a role in informing policy. Germany collaborates with France on Africa strategy.
Ascendant Partners: New Dynamics
India: India positions its engagement with Africa as a partnership rooted in shared anti-colonial history, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and South-South cooperation principles. The primary platform has been the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), held in 2008 (New Delhi), 2011 (Addis Ababa), and 2015 (New Delhi). These summits saw major commitments, including substantial Lines of Credit (LoCs) for development projects ($5.4bn at IAFS-I, $5bn at IAFS-II, $10bn at IAFS-III), grant assistance, and tens of thousands of scholarships for African students. India focuses heavily on capacity building through programs like the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and initiatives like the Pan-African e-Network project. Trade has grown significantly, reaching $83.3 billion two-way, making India Africa's third-largest trade partner. Indian investment (ODI) totaled $50.4 billion between 2000-2023, spanning various sectors. Recently, defence cooperation has gained prominence, with India emerging as a key supplier to several African nations and organizing the India-Africa Defence Ministers' Conference. India championed the AU's permanent membership in the G20. However, the IAFS has not convened since 2015, leading to calls for its revival to maintain momentum. India is often presented, including in joint initiatives with Japan, as a sustainable development partner and an alternative to China. Like other powers, India's engagement serves its own interests, including securing critical minerals for its energy transition and expanding defence exports.
Turkey: Under President Erdogan, Turkey has dramatically expanded its footprint in Africa, guided by a "win-win" philosophy emphasizing mutual respect and partnership, often contrasted favorably by African leaders with Western or Chinese approaches. Diplomatic presence surged from 12 embassies in 2002 to 44 by 2022, with a reciprocal increase in African embassies in Ankara. Trade volume grew sevenfold between 2003 and 2023, reaching $37 billion, with an ambitious target of $50 billion. Turkish institutions like TIKA (development agency), the Red Crescent, and the Maarif Foundation (providing thousands of scholarships) are active across the continent in development, humanitarian aid, healthcare, and education. Security cooperation is a key pillar, with Turkey providing military training and support, and notably, selling its Bayraktar drones to countries like Mali, Niger, and Nigeria to combat insurgents. The AU declared Turkey a 'Strategic Partner' in 2008. Turkey's rise provides African nations another significant partner, particularly in the defence sector, serving Ankara's goals of expanding trade and geopolitical influence.
United Arab Emirates (UAE): The UAE's Africa strategy is sharply focused on logistics, trade, and maritime security. It aims to secure key maritime routes (Red Sea, Gulf of Aden) and establish itself as a global trade hub connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa by investing heavily in and managing African ports. Two state-linked giants lead this push: DP World, a top global port operator, holds concessions and manages operations in strategic locations like Berbera (Somaliland, key for Ethiopia), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Dakar (Senegal), Luanda (Angola), and is developing the Banana Port in the DRC. AD Ports Group is active in Kamsar (Guinea, bauxite), Pointe Noire (Congo), and also secured a concession in Luanda, indicating significant UAE focus on Angolan logistics. A planned major port project in Sudan (Abu Amama) was reportedly cancelled amid the conflict. These investments aim to strengthen supply chains, particularly to landlocked countries, facilitate rapidly growing UAE-Africa trade ($37bn in 2012 to $80bn in 2022), secure access to resources (e.g., Guinean bauxite), and enhance the UAE's food security by tapping into Africa's agricultural potential.
Japan: Japan's engagement is structured around the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process, initiated in 1993, and primarily implemented by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Japan emphasizes partnership, African ownership, and "human security". Its focus is often on high-quality infrastructure development (e.g., Nacala Port Mozambique, Mombasa SEZ Kenya, geothermal power Kenya) and human resource development. Key initiatives include the ABE Initiative, which provides graduate education and internships in Japan for African youth to foster business ties (over 1,600 alumni), and Project NINJA supporting African startups. Japan actively supports the AU's Agenda 2063 and AfCFTA implementation through trade facilitation, infrastructure projects, and technical assistance to AUDA-NEPAD. Japan makes significant financial contributions through TICAD pledges (e.g., $30 billion public/private announced at TICAD 8), co-financing with the AfDB (EPSA5), contributions to global health funds (Global Fund, Gavi), and support for sectors like healthcare and renewable energy. Japan also collaborates with India on African initiatives, presenting a model focused on quality and sustainability. Japan's interests include securing resources (particularly energy), accessing markets for its technology and infrastructure expertise, and building diplomatic partnerships.
The following table provides a comparative snapshot of the primary interests and engagement areas of these significant external powers:
This diverse engagement landscape underscores that Africa's international relations are increasingly complex and multipolar. While presenting opportunities for African nations to diversify partnerships and potentially play external actors against each other, it also necessitates careful navigation to avoid fragmentation and ensure that external engagements align with long-term African development goals.
Comparing External Powers
The intensified engagement of multiple external powers in Africa brings different models of economic interaction, governance influence, and security cooperation into contact and, increasingly, competition. Understanding these contrasting approaches and their geopolitical implications is crucial for assessing the impact on the continent.
Comparing the "Big Three": US, China, Russia
The distinct strategies of the United States, China, and Russia create a complex dynamic for African nations:
Economic Models: The US approach blends development aid, preferential trade access (AGOA), and promoting private sector investment (Prosper Africa), alongside strategic infrastructure initiatives (PGI) positioned as a high-standard alternative. China's model has been dominated by large-scale, state-led infrastructure financing via the BRI, often through loans tied to Chinese contractors, resulting in significant trade dominance, although this massive lending has recently contracted. Russia's economic engagement is comparatively limited, focused primarily on arms sales and resource extraction deals, often directly linked to security provision by state proxies, with less emphasis on broader trade or development investment.
Governance Influence: The US officially promotes democracy, human rights, and good governance, embedding these principles in aid eligibility (MCC) and policy rhetoric, though practical application can be inconsistent due to competing security or geopolitical interests (the "policy trilemma"). China explicitly adheres to a principle of non-interference in internal affairs, which appeals to some African governments wary of external pressure, although the CCP actively cultivates ties with ruling parties. Russia actively supports incumbent regimes, regardless of their democratic credentials, often propping up authoritarian leaders and military juntas through security assistance and political backing, thereby directly undermining democratic processes in countries like Mali, CAR, and Sudan.
Security Paradigms: AFRICOM leads the US security approach, focusing on building partner capacity, counter-terrorism operations, joint exercises, and countering malign actors, framed within a partner-centric philosophy. China is expanding its security role through increased arms sales, training, potential base considerations (beyond Djibouti), and participation in peacekeeping, but its primary focus remains economic. Russia's security engagement is more direct and often disruptive, relying heavily on arms sales and the deployment of state-controlled mercenaries (Wagner/Africa Corps) to provide regime security, combat insurgents, and secure resource concessions, often operating outside international norms and accountability structures.
The Geopolitics of Rivalry
This competition for influence manifests across multiple domains: access to strategic minerals and energy resources, growing consumer markets, diplomatic alignment in international organizations (like UN votes), and control over strategic locations such as ports and potential military bases.
The impact of this great power competition (GPC) is particularly evident in regions already grappling with instability. The Sahel serves as a stark case study. Here, competition between external powers (notably France and Russia) intersected with pre-existing local dynamics – weak governance, jihadist insurgencies, popular grievances against ruling elites, and anti-colonial sentiments. Russia and its Wagner proxy actively exploited anti-French narratives following perceived failures of French/Western counter-terrorism efforts. Military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger leveraged this geopolitical rivalry to justify severing ties with France and aligning with Russia, fundamentally reshaping regional security architecture and undermining Western influence. This demonstrates how GPC doesn't occur in a vacuum but can act as a powerful catalyst or accelerant for existing local conflicts and political shifts.
Other potential flashpoints where external rivalries could exacerbate conflict include Libya and Sudan, where various external actors (including Russia/Wagner, Turkey, UAE, Egypt, Western nations) have backed different factions or competed for influence, and potentially the Horn of Africa due to its strategic location. The presence of multiple external military actors, including proxies, increases the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
However, GPC in Africa may not always manifest as direct proxy wars reminiscent of the Cold War. Analysis suggests that great powers may have limited motivation for deep military involvement in many African conflicts. Competition might not always be zero-sum; powers could find their interests converging (e.g., maritime security against piracy) or might even find themselves backing the same local actor for different strategic reasons. In such scenarios, the challenge becomes less about preventing proxy conflict and more about managing complex deconfliction between external forces operating in close proximity, countering harassment, and navigating behind-the-scenes political maneuvering. This implies a more nuanced, multi-layered form of competition requiring sophisticated diplomatic and strategic responses.
African nations generally seek to avoid being drawn into these rivalries and forced into making zero-sum choices, reflecting painful memories of Cold War proxy conflicts and a strong emphasis on sovereignty. While the US administration has stated it will not force such choices, the inherent pressures of GPC can make genuine non-alignment difficult to maintain.
The competition also plays out in multilateral arenas. African nations constitute a significant voting bloc at the UN (28%), making their support valuable. China, in particular, has successfully leveraged African support to secure leadership positions in UN agencies and advance its agenda within the multilateral system. Conversely, GPC friction, particularly between the US, EU, and China, has hampered the functioning of institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO), notably paralyzing its Dispute Settlement Mechanism. This disproportionately affects less powerful members, including African countries, who rely on such mechanisms to defend their trade interests.
Africa's Economy: Opportunities and Risks
External engagement brings both significant opportunities and considerable risks for Africa's economic development. While foreign investment and partnerships can fuel growth and address critical needs, they can also entrench vulnerabilities and lead to uneven outcomes.
The Dividend of Engagement
External powers have played a major role in addressing Africa's substantial infrastructure deficit. China's BRI, in particular, funded numerous large-scale projects like ports, railways, roads, and power plants, visibly transforming landscapes in many countries. Other partners, including Japan (quality infrastructure focus), the UAE (ports and logistics), and the US (through PGI), are also significant contributors. Addressing these gaps is crucial, as poor infrastructure significantly inflates costs, hindering trade and competitiveness; road transport costs within Africa, for example, can account for nearly 30% of the price of goods.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from diverse partners has flowed into the continent, with the UK, US, China, and India being major sources. This investment carries the potential for job creation and economic diversification. Preferential market access schemes, notably the US AGOA, have provided opportunities for African exporters, particularly in sectors like apparel. The AfCFTA represents a massive, albeit largely untapped, opportunity for boosting intra-regional trade and reducing reliance on external markets.
Development aid and targeted programs have also yielded tangible benefits. The US PEPFAR program is widely lauded for its impact on the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Contributions from various partners support health systems, education, agricultural development, and capacity building across the continent.
The Costs and Risks
Despite these benefits, external engagement carries significant risks and costs for African economies.
Debt Burden: A major concern is the sharp increase in public debt across the continent since 2010. While external borrowing, including for infrastructure projects financed by China and others, has contributed to development, it has also pushed many countries into or towards debt distress. In 2023, nearly half of African nations had debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 60%, and rising debt service costs are consuming increasingly large shares of government revenue, often exceeding spending on critical sectors like health or education.
Resource Dependency: Many African economies remain heavily reliant on the export of primary commodities (oil, gas, minerals). This makes them highly vulnerable to volatile global prices and demand shocks, as seen during the 2014 commodity price collapse. Much external investment, particularly from the UK, China, and Russia, remains concentrated in these extractive sectors, potentially reinforcing this dependency rather than fostering diversification.
Trade Imbalances and Low Regional Integration: Africa remains heavily reliant on a small number of external trading partners, with over half of its imports and exports tied to just five non-African economies. Intra-African trade remains stubbornly low, accounting for only about 16% of total trade. This external orientation increases vulnerability to global shocks and limits opportunities for developing regional value chains. Furthermore, externally driven trade deals can sometimes negatively impact the development of nascent local industries.
Impact on Local Employment and Industry: The benefits of large infrastructure projects do not always translate into significant local job creation or skills development. Some Chinese-funded projects, for instance, have faced criticism for primarily employing Chinese workers rather than building local capacity.
Governance Challenges: Underlying many economic challenges are persistent issues of governance. Access to finance, the prevalence of the informal sector, burdensome tax rates, and corruption remain major obstacles for businesses across Africa. The varying approaches of external partners towards governance – from active promotion to deliberate non-interference or even support for corrupt elites – can significantly impact the environment for sustainable economic development.
This complex interplay reveals a development paradox: while Africa attracts significant external investment that addresses critical needs like infrastructure, this engagement often reinforces structural vulnerabilities such as commodity dependence and unsustainable debt burdens. It has yet to sufficiently catalyze the diversification needed to build resilience or unlock the full potential of intra-regional trade. Achieving more inclusive and sustainable growth requires not only leveraging external partnerships but also tackling internal constraints. The success of transformative initiatives like the AfCFTA ultimately depends on African-led efforts to bridge infrastructure gaps, dismantle non-tariff barriers, improve access to finance, strengthen energy security, and enhance governance. External partners can support these efforts, but genuine progress requires sustained political will and effective implementation from within the continent.
African Agency
Amidst the complex web of external interests and pressures, African actors – governments, regional organizations, civil society, and citizens – are not passive bystanders. They actively navigate the geopolitical landscape, pursuing their own interests, shaping partnerships, and striving for greater autonomy.
Navigating External Pressures
African governments frequently employ strategies of balancing and diversifying their international partnerships to maximize economic and political benefits while avoiding over-dependence on any single external power. The presence of a wider range of actors (US, China, Russia, EU, India, Turkey, UAE, Japan, etc.) provides more options than during the Cold War bipolarity. Examples include Angola reportedly adjusting its deep reliance on China or the Sahelian states pivoting from France to Russia. This reflects a pragmatic approach aimed at leveraging competition for national advantage.
However, this agency operates within constraints. Regime survival instincts can heavily influence foreign policy choices, sometimes prioritizing short-term security guarantees over long-term development goals or democratic principles. Internal political dynamics, economic vulnerabilities, and historical legacies also shape decision-making. Crucially, there is a strong desire across the continent to resist being forced into zero-sum choices between competing global powers, reflecting a deep-seated commitment to sovereignty and non-alignment born from colonial and Cold War experiences.
The Role of Regional Bodies
Regional and continental organizations play a significant, albeit often challenging, role in articulating African positions and coordinating responses.
The African Union (AU): The AU serves as a key normative body, promoting principles of constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule of law across the continent. It aspires to project African agency on the global stage, as seen in its response to the Ukraine crisis (attempting non-aligned diplomacy focused on food security impacts) and its successful campaign for permanent G20 membership. Many external partners, like Germany and Japan, explicitly align their initiatives with AU goals and support its institutions like AUDA-NEPAD. However, the AU's effectiveness is often constrained by deep divisions among its 55 member states (making consensus difficult, especially on contentious issues like Ukraine), a lack of robust enforcement mechanisms for its own norms (e.g., regarding coups), and chronic underfunding and resource limitations.
Regional Economic Communities (RECs): RECs like ECOWAS, SADC, and EAC are considered the primary "building blocks" of African integration. They often take the lead in practical interventions related to conflict management and democratization within their respective regions. ECOWAS, historically anchored by Nigeria, has been the most assertive, intervening militarily, imposing sanctions, and mediating political crises in several West African states. SADC and EAC have also undertaken stabilization efforts but have been less consistent in upholding democratic norms, sometimes tolerating authoritarian member states. Other RECs, like ECCAS in Central Africa, struggle significantly due to internal conflicts, lack of strong leadership, mutual mistrust among members, and severe resource constraints. While RECs have made progress in economic integration (e.g., establishing free trade areas, common external tariffs in ECOWAS, the Southern African Power Pool in SADC) and facilitating freer movement of people (especially ECOWAS and EAC with visa protocols or regional passports), their overall effectiveness is hampered by familiar challenges: member states' reluctance to cede sovereignty, lack of political will for deep integration, insufficient funding (with many heavily reliant on external donors, unlike ECOWAS), and weak institutional capacity.
Public Perspectives
Insights from public opinion surveys, particularly Afrobarometer, reveal crucial perspectives from African citizens:
Demand for Democracy: There remains strong and widespread popular support for democracy as the preferred system of government (around 66-70% prefer it) and consistent rejection of authoritarian alternatives like military rule, one-party rule, or one-man rule.
Value for Elections: Most Africans (75%) see elections as the best method for choosing leaders. They also endorse core democratic norms like multiparty competition, term limits, rule of law, and media freedom.
Disillusionment and Declining Satisfaction: Despite this preference, satisfaction with the way democracy actually works is low (only 38% satisfied in 2021-22) and has declined over the past decade. There are significant concerns about the quality and effectiveness of elections, with low trust in electoral management bodies (39% trust) and skepticism about whether elections ensure representation or enable removal of non-performing leaders.
Tolerance for Alternatives: Worryingly, opposition to military rule, while still the majority view, has weakened significantly in the past decade, particularly in countries experiencing instability or coups (e.g., Mali, Burkina Faso). Over half (53%) express willingness to tolerate military intervention if they perceive elected leaders are abusing power. This tolerance is notably higher among youth.
Foreign Policy Views: Public opinion on foreign policy matters. Surveys suggest citizens are often more skeptical of free trade agreements than their governments, but paradoxically, more supportive of liberalizing the free movement of people across borders.
This reveals a critical disconnect: African citizens persistently demand democracy and accountable governance, yet they perceive a significant gap between this demand and the actual supply provided by their political systems. This governance deficit, characterized by corruption, poor service delivery, and sometimes manipulated elections, fuels public frustration and disillusionment. This gap creates fertile ground for instability and makes populations more receptive to populist rhetoric or even undemocratic alternatives like military intervention, especially when external powers prioritize stability or strategic alignment over consistent democracy support. Bridging this gap between democratic aspirations and lived realities is perhaps the most fundamental challenge for both African leaders and their international partners.
Conclusion
Africa in the mid-2020s stands as a continent of immense potential and complex challenges, increasingly central to global economic and geopolitical calculations. Its engagement with the world is characterized by a multi-layered interplay of external powers – the United States, China, and Russia locked in intensifying competition, alongside established European actors recalibrating their roles, and ascendant partners like India, Turkey, the UAE, and Japan forging new ties. Each actor brings distinct motivations, strategies, and impacts, ranging from infrastructure development and trade promotion to security provision, resource extraction, and ideological influence.
The United States grapples with revitalizing its partnerships and balancing its promotion of democratic values against pressing security concerns and the demands of great power competition. China, having fueled an infrastructure boom through massive lending, now navigates the complexities of debt sustainability while seeking to maintain its economic dominance. Russia offers security solutions, often through disruptive proxies, exploiting instability and anti-Western sentiment to gain influence and resources. Other powers like France adjust to diminished influence in former strongholds, the UK charts a post-Brexit course amidst declining trade and aid, while India, Turkey, the UAE, and Japan expand their economic, diplomatic, and security engagements, driven by their own national interests.
This crowded and competitive landscape presents both opportunities and risks for Africa. It offers African nations greater leverage to diversify partnerships and negotiate better terms. However, it also risks importing external rivalries, exacerbating local conflicts (as seen vividly in the Sahel), fragmenting policy approaches, and potentially deepening dependencies. While external investment addresses critical needs like infrastructure, it often reinforces reliance on volatile commodity exports and contributes to unsustainable debt burdens, failing to sufficiently catalyze the structural transformation needed for resilient growth.
Africa is not merely a passive stage for these global dramas. African governments actively maneuver within this complex environment, employing strategies of balancing and non-alignment to protect their sovereignty and advance national interests. Regional bodies like the African Union and various RECs strive to foster integration, manage conflicts, and articulate common positions, though their effectiveness remains hampered by internal divisions, resource constraints, and challenges to member state political will. Perhaps most importantly, African citizens consistently express strong aspirations for democratic governance and accountability, even as they grapple with disillusionment over its delivery.
