European defense Capabilities and Expenditures: A Comparative Assessment (2023-2025)

I. Executive Summary

Europe's defense situation is changing profoundly right now. This shift is mainly because of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has made the security environment feel much less stable. This report takes a close look at the defense budgets, military power, modernization projects, and alliances of European nations. Global military spending hit record highs in 2023, reaching $2.443 trillion, and again in 2024 at $2.46 trillion. Europe saw the biggest spending jumps in decades. In fact, European NATO members plus Canada together went over the 2% of GDP spending guideline in 2024. It's projected that 23 individual allies will meet or go beyond this benchmark, a huge increase from just three back in 2014.

Even with all this new investment, there are still big challenges. Lots of European armed forces are short on people; they're finding it tough to recruit and keep soldiers, especially those with specialized skills. This raises worries about how ready these forces really are and if they can handle the increased NATO commitments. Major upgrades are happening, like Germany's Zeitenwende and France's SCORPION program. There's also a renewed push to stock up on ammunition and boost air defense. However, the defense industry across the continent is struggling with things like supply chain problems and fragmented demand, which makes it hard to quickly produce everything that's needed.

NATO continues to be the main pillar of collective defense for most European countries, and it's adapting with new force models and a stronger forward presence. At the same time, European Union defense efforts, like the European defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), are gaining momentum. These aim for more industrial cooperation and strategic independence, although funding limits and national priorities hold them back somewhat. Europe still relies quite a bit on the United States for key things like strategic airlift, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and advanced air defense. It looks like Europe is heading towards having stronger military capabilities, but it still faces hurdles in turning more money into enough troops, readiness, and industrial output to handle a more dangerous world.

II. The European defense Landscape

The global security scene has gotten more complicated and unpredictable. We're seeing the rules-based order weaken and large-scale conventional war return to Europe. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a real turning point; it totally changed how Europe sees threats and led to big shifts in defense strategies and spending. Adding to this are the changing relationships across the Atlantic. Questions about how committed the U.S. will be to European security in the long run are affecting how European capitals plan their strategies. This report looks at the defense situation in European nations considering all this, examining budgets, forces, equipment, capabilities, upgrades, and the role of alliances.

For this analysis, "Europe" includes a wide range of countries:

• European Union Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.

• Non-EU NATO Members in Europe: Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Türkiye (European part), United Kingdom.

• Other Geographically European States: Andorra, Armenia*, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia*, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, Vatican City.

• Transcontinental States (European Portions): Russia (European part), Kazakhstan (European part), Azerbaijan (European part).

(Note: Armenia and Georgia are geographically in West Asia but often seen as politically European). This broad view helps us see the whole picture, recognizing how security is linked across the continent while also understanding the specific roles of alliances like NATO and the EU.

The analysis uses publicly available data from reliable sources. Key sources include:

• The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for global and national military spending trends.

• The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance for details on forces and equipment.

• NATO official releases for alliance spending data.

• The European defense Agency (EDA) for EU defense trends.

Most data covers the 2023-2024 period, with 2025 estimates included where possible. It's worth remembering that defense spending figures can differ between sources because they might use different definitions (like including pensions or paramilitary forces) and methods. This report uses the most consistent data available but acknowledges these potential variations.

III. European defense Expenditures

Aggregate Trends and Drivers

Since 2014, and especially since Russia's big invasion of Ukraine in 2022, military spending globally and in Europe has gone up dramatically, reversing the decline seen after the Cold War. Global military spending hit about $2.443 trillion in 2023, a 6.8% real increase from 2022 – the sharpest yearly rise since 2009 and the highest SIPRI ever recorded. This trend kept going in 2024, with estimated global spending at $2.46 trillion, up 7.4% in real terms from 2023. That's around 2.3% of global GDP in 2023 and 1.94% in 2024.

Europe has really been leading this spending increase. Military spending in Europe saw its biggest jump in at least 30 years back in 2022. In 2023, Ukraine became the world's eighth-largest spender at $64.8 billion, boosting its spending by 51% from the previous year, which took up a massive 37% of its GDP. Russia's spending also shot up, estimated at $109 billion in 2023 (a 24% increase), making up 5.9% of its GDP. It wasn't just the countries directly involved in the war; spending rose across the whole continent. European NATO members together increased their spending significantly. For 2024, European NATO allies and Canada were projected to spend a combined total over $485 billion (adjusted to 2021 prices), hitting 2.02% of their combined GDP. That's nearly a 20% increase in defense investment compared to 2023. Overall European NATO spending in 2024 was estimated to be over 50% higher in nominal terms than it was in 2014. Similarly, the 27 EU member states together spent €279 billion (1.6% of GDP) in 2023, with projections reaching €326 billion (1.9% of GDP) in 2024.

The main reasons for this huge increase are pretty clear:

• The ongoing war in Ukraine.

• A totally changed view of the threat Russia poses.

• Increased geopolitical tensions around the world.

• Constant pressure within NATO, partly influenced by US policy signals, for countries to share the burden more fairly.

This spending surge since 2022 shows a fundamental rethink of European security, moving away from the post-Cold War focus on saving money (the 'peace dividend') and back towards prioritizing rebuilding military strength and deterrence. But, this quick, reactive increase raises questions about whether it's financially sustainable in the long run without bigger economic or political changes, especially with other demands on national budgets.

NATO's 2% Guideline: Compliance, Challenges, and Definitions

A big part of the conversation about European defense spending revolves around NATO's guideline, which started at the 2006 Riga Summit and became official at the 2014 Wales Summit. It pushes allies to spend at least 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. The 2014 Wales Pledge also included a goal to put at least 20% of defense spending towards major new equipment and related research and development. Confirmed again at later summits, like Vilnius in 2023, the 2% figure is now often seen more as a minimum baseline rather than a maximum target, given the current security situation.

Meeting this 2% guideline has gotten much better lately. While only three allies hit the target in 2014, that number rose to 11 in 2023. For 2024, projections suggested that 23 out of 32 allies would meet or exceed the 2% mark. Importantly, the combined spending of European NATO members and Canada crossed the 2% threshold together in 2024 for the first time ever.

This progress happened because several countries significantly ramped up their spending.

• Poland leads the way in percentage terms, dedicating over 4% of its GDP to defense in 2024.

• Estonia and Latvia also spend well over the target, at more than 3%, which makes sense given their location on the Eastern Flank.

• Greece has consistently spent above 2%, hitting 3.1% in 2024.

• Germany notably met the 2% target in 2024 for the first time since the early 1990s, becoming Europe's biggest defense spender in absolute terms.

• Finland and Sweden, when they joined the alliance, also pledged to meet the target.

• The UK has always met the 2% target and was projected at 2.33% for 2024, with plans to reach 2.5% by 2027.

• France was projected at 2.06% for 2024.

But these headline numbers don't tell the whole story, as there are ongoing debates about how NATO defines defense spending. The alliance uses a broad definition agreed on by members, which includes things beyond just military budgets, like:

• Military pensions.

• Costs for paramilitary forces (like gendarmeries or coast guards if they have military roles).

• Contributions to UN peacekeeping.

• Potentially some types of aid or infrastructure spending.

This can make NATO's reported figures quite different from what countries publish in their national budgets. For instance, Spain might include the budget for its Guardia Civil, which could significantly inflate its reported NATO spending. Similarly, the UK started including war pensions and UN peacekeeping contributions in its NATO figures from 2014. Because of this flexibility in definition, just hitting the 2% target numerically doesn't automatically mean a country has proportionally increased its deployable combat forces or invested comparably in military readiness compared to other allies.

Furthermore, people are increasingly questioning if the 2% target is even enough anymore. Given how much rebuilding is needed after years of underinvestment and the heightened threat level, some analysts and policymakers argue 2% is too low. Calls for higher targets, like 2.5% or 3% of GDP, are becoming more frequent in European strategic discussions. These calls are amplified by suggestions from some US political figures that allies should aim much higher, maybe even up to 5% of GDP, though that's widely seen as unrealistic for most European nations. This reflects a growing realization that significant, ongoing investment is needed not just to meet current NATO commitments but also to build the resilience and capabilities required for potential future conflicts.

Overview of European defense Budgets (2023/2024 Estimates)

Here's a comparison of defense spending for various European nations, mainly based on SIPRI data for 2023 and NATO estimates for 2024 where available. Keep in mind figures can vary depending on the source and how spending is defined. (Note: The following list is derived from the table data provided in the original document, sources).

• Albania: ~1.7% (2023 NATO), 1.86% (2024 NATO est.). NATO Member.

• Austria: ~0.8% (2022 SIPRI). EU Member.

• Belarus: ~1.9% (2022 SIPRI).

• Belgium: ~1.2% (2023 NATO), 1.30% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Aims for 2% by 2029.

• Bosnia & Herzegovina: ~1.4% (2022 SIPRI).

• Bulgaria: ~1.9% (2023 NATO), 1.98% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Croatia: ~1.8% (2023 NATO), 1.81% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Cyprus: ~1.8% (2022 SIPRI). EU Member.

• Czechia: ~1.5% (2023 NATO), 2.10% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Denmark: ~2.0% (2023 NATO), 2.37% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Significant increase planned.

• Estonia: ~3.1% (2023 NATO), 3.43% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Finland: ~2.4% (2023 NATO), 2.41% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member (Joined NATO 2023).

• France: ~2.1% (2023 NATO), 2.06% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Budget €50.5bn (excl. pensions) for 2025. Aiming >3% by 2030.

• Germany: ~1.5% (2023 NATO), 2.12% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Includes special fund (Sondervermögen). Largest European spender.

• Greece: ~3.2% (2023 NATO), 3.08% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Hungary: ~2.1% (2023 NATO), 2.11% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Iceland: N/A. NATO Member (no standing army).

• Ireland: ~0.2% (2022 SIPRI). EU Member.

• Italy: ~1.6% (2023 NATO), 1.49% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Consistently below 2%.

• Latvia: ~2.8% (2023 NATO), 3.15% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Lithuania: ~2.8% (2023 NATO), 2.85% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Luxembourg: ~0.8% (2023 NATO), 1.29% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Significant % increase 2023-24.

• Malta: ~0.6% (2022 SIPRI). EU Member.

• Moldova: ~0.4% (2022 SIPRI).

• Montenegro: ~1.6% (2023 NATO), 2.02% (2024 NATO est.). NATO Member.

• Netherlands: ~1.5% (2023 NATO), 2.05% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Significant increases planned.

• North Macedonia: ~1.9% (2023 NATO), 2.22% (2024 NATO est.). NATO Member.

• Norway: ~1.6% (2023 NATO), 1.80% (2024 NATO est.). NATO Member.

• Poland: ~3.8% (2023 NATO), 4.12% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Highest % GDP spender in NATO. Plans for 4.7% in 2025.

• Portugal: ~1.5% (2023 NATO), 1.55% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Consistently below 2%.

• Romania: ~1.6% (2023 NATO), 1.99% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Russia: ~5.9% (2023 est.). Spending estimated at ~6% GDP in 2023/24. 2024 budget estimated at $146bn.

• Serbia: ~2.9% (2022 SIPRI).

• Slovakia: ~2.0% (2023 NATO), 2.00% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member.

• Slovenia: ~1.3% (2023 NATO), 1.29% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Consistently below 2%.

• Spain: ~1.5% (2023 NATO), 1.28% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member. Consistently below 2%.

• Sweden: ~1.5% (2023 NATO), 2.14% (2024 NATO est.). NATO & EU Member (Joined NATO 2024). Significant increases planned.

• Switzerland: ~0.7% (2023 SIPRI).

• Türkiye: ~1.5% (2023 NATO), 2.09% (2024 NATO est.). NATO Member. Spending around 1.5% GDP.

• Ukraine: ~37.0% (2023 SIPRI). Received significant military aid (~$35bn in 2023) on top of own spending.

• United Kingdom: ~2.3% (2023 NATO), 2.33% (2024 NATO est.). NATO Member. 2nd largest NATO spender. Plans for 2.5% by 2027.

(Sources: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2023, NATO defense Expenditure Data (June 2024 estimates), PIIE for NATO 2023 figures). N/A means data wasn't readily available or country isn't part of NATO reporting.

IV. Investment Focus: Procurement, R&D, and Personnel Costs

Looking past the total budget numbers, how the money is actually spent tells us a lot about priorities and potential limitations. NATO's guideline suggests allies spend at least 20% of their defense budgets on buying major equipment and related Research & Development (R&D). Compliance here has also improved a lot. In 2023, 28 NATO allies hit this 20% equipment spending target, way up from just 7 in 2014. NATO data showed that European NATO members spent an average of 32% of their defense budgets on equipment in 2024, a huge jump from 14% in 2014.

Data from the European defense Agency (EDA) confirms this trend for EU members. defense investment (which EDA defines as research, development, and procurement) jumped 17% in 2023 to a record €72 billion. This was 26% of total EU defense spending – the highest level since EDA started tracking in 2005. Projections for 2024 hinted this could climb over €100 billion, maybe even exceeding 30% of total defense spending. Within this investment, buying equipment takes the lion's share, making up over 80% (€61 billion) of EU defense investments in 2023, with projections suggesting procurement spending might top €90 billion in 2024. This surge is driven by efforts to modernize forces and restock supplies used up supporting Ukraine.

However, investment in defense Research and Technology (R&T) – which is vital for staying ahead technologically in the future – seems to be lagging. EU member states spent about €4 billion on defense R&T in 2023. While that's almost triple the amount spent in 2016, it was only 1.4% of total defense spending, falling short of the collective 2% benchmark for R&T. This hints at a possible imbalance, where immediate buying needs are prioritized, maybe at the cost of long-term innovation.

Furthermore, personnel costs still eat up a big chunk of European defense budgets. In 2022, salaries and pensions accounted for 45% of military spending across the EU. Germany, for example, aims for a budget split of roughly 50% for personnel, 30% for operations and maintenance, and only 20% for equipment investment. While necessary, high fixed personnel costs can limit the money available for modernization, training, and readiness, even when overall budgets go up. This highlights the challenge European nations face in balancing investment in future capabilities, buying modern gear, maintaining readiness, and managing significant personnel costs within limited budgets.

V. Comparative Assessment of European Military Capabilities

Personnel Strength: Active, Reserve, and Emerging Challenges

Manpower is still a basic part of military strength. Looking at the number of personnel in European armed forces shows a mixed picture: some nations have substantial numbers, but many face widespread problems with recruitment, retention, and overall readiness.

Major European powers keep large standing forces:

• France had around 270,000 active personnel in 2021, plus reserves, though some sources suggest a higher figure near 304,000 more recently.

• Germany's Bundeswehr had about 180,215 active personnel in mid-2024.

• The United Kingdom's total force (regulars, Gurkhas, reserves) was around 180,780 in early 2025.

• Other significant forces include Italy (approx. 338,000), Spain (approx. 199,000), Poland (approx. 189,000 and growing), and Greece (approx. 147,000).

• Russia maintains the largest military in Europe, though exact numbers are hard to get due to the war; estimates suggested around 700,000 troops were involved in Ukraine by late 2024.

• Ukraine, through mobilization, has also greatly increased its personnel numbers.

Despite these numbers, many European nations, especially in the West, are having real trouble recruiting and keeping people. Armed forces find it hard to compete with the private sector for talent, particularly in high-tech areas. Germany's Bundeswehr, for instance, is actually shrinking even though it aims to reach 203,000 soldiers by 2031, hurt by fewer applicants and high dropout rates. The force is also getting older, with the average age up to 34. The UK has also seen its total force strength and number of fully trained personnel decrease in recent years. This lack of personnel exists even as NATO's New Force Model calls for more troops at high readiness levels. Germany, for example, has committed 35,000 troops to the model's higher readiness tiers, but actually meeting this commitment, along with deploying a full brigade to Lithuania, is a big challenge given current personnel numbers and readiness problems.

European nations are trying different things to fix this. They're working on improving pay and conditions, offering more flexible career paths (like the UK's 'zigzag' careers idea), and looking at entry standards. Several countries, particularly in the Nordic and Baltic regions, have expanded or brought back forms of conscription or national service. Germany is also seriously discussing bringing back some form of compulsory service to deal with its personnel shortage.

The gap between rising defense budgets and flat or shrinking personnel numbers points to a critical weakness. Demographic trends, changing attitudes about military service, and economic competition mean that just throwing more money at the problem doesn't guarantee enough manpower. This shortage directly affects overall military readiness, the ability to sustain operations, and the capacity to meet demanding alliance commitments like the NATO Force Model. It represents a significant limitation on European military power and deterrence.

Armed Forces Personnel Summary (Selected Nations, approx. 2023-2025)

Here's a quick look at personnel numbers for some key nations, though data years vary and should be cross-referenced with definitive sources like IISS Military Balance. (Note: This list is derived from the table data in the original document, sources).

• France: 270,000 - 304,000 Active; ~63,700 Reserve. Total: ~333,000 - 368,000. (Army: ~118k, Air Force: ~43k, Navy: ~36k).

• Germany: ~180,215 Active; ~34,600 Reserve (+ larger pool). Total: ~214,815+. (Army: ~61k). (2024 data).

• United Kingdom: ~136,117 Regulars + ~4,127 Gurkhas; ~31,967 Volunteer Reserve. Total UK Forces: ~180,779. (Navy/Marines: ~32k, Army: ~74k, RAF: ~30k Regulars). (Jan 2025 data).

• Italy: ~338,000 Active (Verify source).

• Poland: ~189,000 Active (Rapidly expanding).

• Spain: ~199,000 Active (Verify source).

• Greece: ~147,000 Active (Verify source).

• Türkiye: Significant forces (Refer to IISS).

• Russia: Large forces, war impact unclear (~700k est. in Ukraine late 2024) (Refer to IISS).

• Ukraine: Significantly mobilized (Refer to IISS).

Major Equipment Inventories: Land, Air, and Maritime Domains

European militaries use a wide array of advanced conventional equipment, but inventories often mix modern gear with older systems that need replacing. Modernization efforts are happening everywhere, driven by the need for better capabilities and interoperability within NATO, and sped up by the war in Ukraine.

• Land Domain: Armoured capabilities are being updated.

• Germany is buying Leopard 2A8 tanks (18 ordered, 105 more approved) and might replace its Fuchs APCs with Patria 6x6 or Pandur Evo vehicles.

• The UK is upgrading 148 Challenger 2 tanks to the Challenger 3 standard, although there could be delays, with the first ones expected in 2027.

• France is rolling out new Griffon and Jaguar armoured vehicles as part of its SCORPION program, replacing older VABs, and recently ordered 530 more Serval vehicles.

• Poland is doing a massive expansion, getting K2 tanks from South Korea and M1 Abrams from the US, plus its own Borsuk IFVs.

• Italy plans to upgrade its Ariete tanks and buy over 1,000 new IFVs, possibly the KF41 Lynx.

• Artillery modernization is also key, with France making Caesar self-propelled howitzers, Poland getting K9 howitzers, and several nations buying HIMARS rocket systems. Producing artillery ammo is a critical focus across Europe.

• Air Domain: Modern fighter jet fleets mostly rely on platforms like the Eurofighter Typhoon (used by UK, Germany, Italy, Spain) and the Dassault Rafale (France, Greece).

• The Lockheed Martin F-35 is being adopted by many European countries (including UK, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Finland, Germany, Switzerland), significantly boosting stealth and network capabilities.

• Older fleets, like the UK's Tranche 1 Typhoons and Germany's Tornados, are being retired.

• Future combat air systems are in development: the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS and the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)/Tempest, aiming for deployment in the late 2030s.

• Strategic airlift depends heavily on the Airbus A400M (used by UK, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Türkiye), along with C-130 Hercules (being retired by UK) and C-17 Globemasters.

• Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) capabilities are somewhat limited; the UK is waiting for three delayed Boeing E-7 Wedgetails, expected by late 2025.

• Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly vital for ISR and strikes; the UK is introducing the Protector RG Mk1 (MQ-9B), while reliance on US systems like Reaper/Global Hawk variants is still common.

• Maritime Domain: Major European navies operate advanced warships and submarines.

• The UK has two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers (with F-35B jets), Type 45 destroyers, and is building Type 26 and Type 31 frigates. It also has Astute-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), with the Dreadnought-class replacement underway.

• France operates the nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier (with a successor, PANG, planned), FREMM and FDI frigates, Barracuda-class SSNs, and Triomphant-class SSBNs (with the SNLE 3G replacement program ongoing).

• Italy operates carriers, destroyers, and frigates.

• Spain also has major surface ships and is introducing S-80 submarines.

• Germany is building F125 and F126 frigates and Type 212A submarines.

• Many nations are investing in Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and mine countermeasures vessels. Naval missile systems like Aster (France, Italy, UK) and Exocet (France) are widely used.

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While modernization is happening everywhere, challenges persist. Old equipment is still common in many inventories, and replacement is often slow due to budget cycles and industrial limits. Restocking munitions and spare parts, used up supporting Ukraine and due to past underinvestment, is a huge task. Achieving enough 'mass' – simply having the required number of platforms for a sustained, high-intensity conflict – remains a worry for many European forces, even as individual platforms become more technologically advanced.

Major Conventional Equipment Holdings (Selected Nations, approx. 2024)

This provides a snapshot of major equipment. Figures are approximate and based mainly on IISS Military Balance 2024 unless noted. Counting methods can vary. (Note: The following list summarizes table data from the original document, sources).

• France: ~222 Leclerc MBTs; ~250 VBCI + ~4000+ VAB/Griffon/Serval/Jaguar IFV/APCs; ~109 Caesar/AUF1 SPG + ~13 LRU MRL; ~225 Rafale/Mirage 2000 jets; 1 Carrier, 3 LHD, 2 LPD, 10 DDG/FFG, 11 FFG; 5 SSN, 4 SSBN.

• Germany: ~266 Leopard 2 MBTs; ~382 Puma + ~398 Boxer + ~1000+ Fuchs/Marder IFV/APCs; ~121 PzH 2000 SPG + ~38 MARS II MRL; ~220 Typhoon/Tornado jets (Tornado being replaced); 12 FFG, 5 Corvettes; 6 SSK (Type 212A).

• United Kingdom: ~157 Challenger 2 MBTs (being upgraded); ~589 Warrior IFV + ~500+ Boxer planned + ~1000+ Mastiff/Ridgback APCs; ~89 AS90 SPG + ~35 M270 MLRS; ~160 Typhoon/F-35B jets; 2 Carriers, 2 LPD, 6 Type 45 DDG, 12 Type 23 FFG; 6 SSN, 4 SSBN.

• Italy: ~160 Ariete MBTs (being upgraded); ~200 Dardo + ~300+ Freccia IFV + ~1500+ M113 variants APCs; ~68 PzH 2000 SPG + ~21 M270 MLRS; ~185 Typhoon/F-35A/B/Tornado/AMX jets; 2 Carriers, 3 LHD, 4 DDG, 12 FFG; 8 SSK (Sauro/Type 212A).

• Poland: ~250 Leopard 2 + ~100+ PT-91 MBTs (Abrams/K2 deliveries ongoing); ~1300 BWP-1/Rosomak IFV/APCs (Borsuk starting); ~500+ Krab/K9/Dana SPG + ~100+ WR-40/HIMARS/Chunmoo MRL; ~90 F-16/MiG-29/Su-22 jets (F-35/FA-50 ongoing); 2 FFG, 1 Corvette; 1 SSK (status uncertain). (Rapidly changing).

• Spain: ~327 Leopard 2E/2A4 MBTs; ~354 Pizarro IFV + ~680+ BMR/VEC APCs (Dragon 8x8 ongoing); ~95 M109 SPG (+ HIMARS ordered); ~140 Typhoon/F-18 jets; 1 LHD, 2 LPD, 5 F100 FFG, 6 F80 FFG; 3 S-70 SSK (being replaced by S-80).

• Greece: ~1200+ Leopard 2/1, M60, M48 MBTs; ~400 BMP-1 IFV + ~2000+ Leonidas/M113 APCs; ~400+ PzH 2000/M109/M110 SPG + ~150 RM-70/M270 MRL; ~230+ F-16/Mirage 2000/F-4 jets (Rafale, F-35 planned); 13 FFG; 11 SSK (Type 209/214).

• Türkiye: ~2200+ Leopard 2/1, M60, M48 MBTs; ~650 ACV-15 IFV + ~2800+ FNSS Pars/Otokar Arma/Cobra APCs; ~1000+ T-155 Firtina/M109/M110 SPG + ~300+ T-122/M270 MRL; ~450+ F-16/F-4 jets (TF-X Kaan dev.); 1 LHD, 16 FFG, 10 Corvettes; 12 SSK (Type 209).

(Acronym Key: MBT=Main Battle Tank, IFV=Infantry Fighting Vehicle, APC=Armoured Personnel Carrier, SPG=Self-Propelled Gun, MRL=Multiple Rocket Launcher, DDG=Destroyer, FFG=Frigate, SSN=Nuclear Attack Submarine, SSK=Diesel-Electric Attack Submarine, SSBN=Ballistic Missile Submarine).

VI. National Military Postures: Strengths and Weaknesses

Judging a nation's military posture means looking beyond just budgets and equipment lists. Key things to consider include:

• Technological level.

• Training quality and personnel readiness.

• Specialized capabilities (like cyber units, special forces (SOF), intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR), and nuclear deterrence for France/UK).

• Ability to project power.

• Domestic defense industry strength.

• Logistics and support systems.

• Depth of munition and equipment stockpiles.

• Interoperability, especially within NATO.

Here's a look at some key nations:

• United Kingdom: Possesses high-tech military capabilities, including a Carrier Strike Group with two carriers and F-35Bs, an independent sea-based nuclear deterrent, well-regarded Special Forces, and strong intelligence services. It aims for a global presence, backed by high training standards and significant contributions to NATO. However, it constantly struggles with recruitment and retention, leaving forces often under-strength. Questions remain about the 'mass' and resilience of UK forces for prolonged high-intensity war, worsened by reported equipment availability issues and concerns that past underfunding created weaknesses that increased budgets might struggle to fix quickly. Funding defense increases partly through cuts to foreign aid has also drawn criticism. Like many allies, the UK still depends on US strategic support for certain large operations.

• France: Stands out with its independent nuclear deterrent (air and sea components), a comprehensive military covering all areas, and strong power projection capabilities (nuclear carrier, overseas bases). It has a capable and fairly autonomous domestic defense industry (supporting Rafale fighters, SCORPION vehicles). French forces are experienced, especially from operations in Africa, and France is a leading military player in the EU. Weaknesses include worries about the overall size ('mass') of its forces, particularly its fighter fleet compared to potential needs. Specific gaps, like dedicated air defense suppression (SEAD/DEAD) assets, have been pointed out, though the upcoming Rafale F5 and associated drones aim to fix some of these. Budget pressures also exist, with ambitious plans (like the SNLE 3G submarine program) competing for funds, potentially straining conventional forces despite recent budget hikes.

• Germany: Its main strength is its economic power, allowing significant investment via the €100 billion Sondervermögen (special fund) after the Zeitenwende policy shift. It has a strong defense industry (Leopard tanks, submarines). Germany is a key NATO framework nation and is showing more commitment to collective defense, like pledging a permanent combat brigade in Lithuania. As Europe's largest economy and now top defense spender in absolute terms, its potential impact is huge. However, the Bundeswehr is still suffering from decades of severe underfunding, leading to critical readiness problems, equipment shortages, and rundown infrastructure. Procurement is notoriously slow and bureaucratic. Personnel shortages are severe, the force is aging, and recruitment goals aren't being met. There's still some societal and political hesitation about a more assertive security role, though this is changing. Big doubts remain about the Bundeswehr's ability to meet its own readiness targets (e.g., war-capable by 2029) and fulfill expanded NATO commitments despite the Zeitenwende.

• Poland: Defined by its rapid, massive modernization and expansion, funded by defense spending over 4% of GDP (NATO's highest). Its location on NATO's Eastern Flank makes it crucial for regional deterrence. Warsaw is buying huge amounts of modern gear: K2 and Abrams tanks, K9 and Krab howitzers, HIMARS and Chunmoo rocket artillery, F-35 and FA-50 combat aircraft, significantly boosting its land forces. It has a strong defense relationship with the US. The main challenges are effectively integrating and sustaining all this new equipment, which needs major investment in training, logistics, and infrastructure. Ensuring these ambitious plans remain affordable long-term is also a factor. Heavy reliance on foreign suppliers (mainly US and South Korea) also brings industrial and supply chain considerations.

• Nordic/Baltic States (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden): Generally show high societal resilience and focus on 'total defense' ideas. defense spending is up across the region (Estonia, Latvia >3% GDP; Finland, Sweden joining NATO and committing to 2%). They have specialized skills for their environment (winter warfare, coastal defense) and benefit from strong regional cooperation (NORDEFCO) and NATO integration. Their main weakness is their relatively small size (population, economy), limiting the overall scale of their forces. Thus, they heavily depend on NATO collective defense guarantees and rapid reinforcement in a crisis.

• Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal): These countries have significant maritime capabilities, reflecting their focus on the Mediterranean. Italy and Spain have capable defense industries. Greece stands out for consistently high defense spending (% of GDP), driven by regional tensions. However, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have often struggled to meet the NATO 2% spending target, usually citing economic reasons. This underinvestment can slow modernization and affect readiness. While they operate advanced platforms, older equipment still exists in their inventories.

• Russia (European Context): Despite heavy losses in Ukraine, Russia still holds significant military strengths relevant to Europe. These include a huge nuclear arsenal, substantial conventional forces (even if weakened), a mobilized defense industry producing or refurbishing lots of equipment (often older designs), and extensive combat experience from the war. Key weaknesses include the loss of modern equipment and experienced troops in Ukraine, the impact of Western sanctions on getting advanced tech, a growing reliance on older hardware, and dependence on partners like Iran and North Korea for ammo and drones. While still formidable (especially due to its size and nukes), Russia's conventional power relative to NATO has been significantly reduced by the war.

Overall, while individual European nations have unique strengths, none possess the comprehensive capabilities of a superpower. High-tech advantages exist, especially among larger powers, but are often balanced out by shortcomings in numbers (mass), readiness, personnel, and logistics. This highlights why collective defense like NATO remains essential, and why there's a growing push for deeper European cooperation to cover individual weaknesses and present a stronger deterrent.

VII. Modernization, Procurement, and Industrial Capacity

The changed security situation in Europe has kicked off ambitious modernization programs and a renewed focus on defense procurement across the continent. This puts major demands on national budgets and the European defense industry.

Key National Modernization Programmes and Strategic Reviews

Several major European countries have launched big initiatives to upgrade their militaries:

• Germany: The Zeitenwende is backed by the €100 billion special fund, though much covers existing commitments or interest. Key purchases include F-35A fighters (for nuclear sharing), P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, CH-47F heavy-lift helicopters, Puma IFV upgrades, Leopard 2A8 tanks, and air defense systems (IRIS-T SLM, Patriot). The goal is to make the Bundeswehr kriegstüchtig (war-capable) by 2029, but significant obstacles remain.

• France: The 2024-2030 Military Programming Law (LPM) allocates €413 billion, with the 2025 budget at €50.5 billion (excluding pensions). Priorities include renewing the nuclear deterrent (SNLE 3G subs, ASN4G missile), continuing Rafale fighter procurement (including F5 standard), the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) with Germany/Spain, the SCORPION army modernization (Griffon, Jaguar, Serval vehicles), and naval upgrades (FDI frigates, Barracuda SSNs, PANG carrier).

• United Kingdom: Committed to raising defense spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 (partly funded by ODA cuts). An external Strategic defense Review (SDR) led by Lord Robertson is due in Spring 2025 to set future priorities. Key programs are the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP)/Tempest fighter (with Italy/Japan), ongoing F-35B procurement (maybe 74 total), Dreadnought SSBN program, Type 26/31 frigates, and Challenger 3 tank upgrade (facing potential delays).

• Poland: Undertaking perhaps Europe's most ambitious conventional rearmament. Buying hundreds of K2 tanks and K9 howitzers (South Korea), M1 Abrams tanks, HIMARS/Chunmoo launchers (US/South Korea), FA-50 light combat aircraft, and F-35A fighters. Aims to create one of Europe's strongest land forces.

• Italy: Modernization includes F-35s, participation in GCAP/Tempest, naval renewal (new subs, surface ships), and plans to upgrade Ariete tanks while seeking a new heavy IFV (over 1,000 planned).

Across Europe, common focus areas include:

• Boosting air and missile defense.

• Getting long-range precision strike systems.

• Replenishing/modernizing artillery and ammo stocks.

• Expanding use of uncrewed systems (air, land, sea).

• Investing in cyber, space, and AI capabilities.

The European defense Industrial Base: Cooperation, Fragmentation, and Capacity

This surge in demand has put immense pressure on the European defense Industrial Base (EDIB). While efforts are underway to boost production, especially for artillery shells (EU aims for 2 million rounds/year capacity by end of 2025), several challenges slow things down.

A key issue is the fragmented European defense market. Governments often favour their own industries, leading to duplicated work, smaller production runs, and no economies of scale. Collaborative projects exist (Eurofighter, A400M, FCAS, GCAP, MGCS), but they're often complex and hit snags due to different national needs and political disagreements. Truly European-scale buying for big items like tanks or artillery could cut costs significantly but faces political resistance.

Supply chain bottlenecks are another major problem, especially for critical parts like microchips, special materials (e.g., armour steel), and explosives for ammo. Shortages of skilled workers also hinder expanding production lines quickly. Plus, the defense industry needs long-term, steady demand to justify big investments in more capacity. Unpredictable national budgets and lack of multi-year funding commitments can make companies wary of investing. How to pay for this surge – through higher national budgets, EU-level ideas like defense bonds, or other methods – is still being debated.

Because of these challenges, European nations have increasingly bought from outside Europe to meet urgent needs, notably South Korea (selling tanks, howitzers, aircraft, mostly to Poland) and Israel (providing rocket artillery, air defense). At the same time, new defense startups are appearing, often focused on software, AI, and drones, potentially shaking up traditional procurement with faster, cheaper approaches.

The EU is actively trying to tackle these industrial problems through initiatives like:

• The European defense Fund (EDF): Incentivizes collaborative R&D.

• PESCO projects: Framework for joint capability development.

• Developing a European defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and related regulations like SAFE (Structure for Armament Programme Cooperation Framework Regulation).

These aim to boost cooperation, reduce fragmentation, and make the EDIB stronger and more competitive. But whether these top-down efforts work ultimately depends on member states' political will to choose collective European solutions over purely national interests. The tension between national sovereignty and the need for European scale continues to shape the future of the continent's defense industry.

VIII. The Framework of Alliances and Partnerships

European defense is deeply tied into a complex network of alliances and partnerships, with NATO being the main collective security framework for most countries on the continent.

NATO's Role: Collective defense, Burden Sharing, and Interoperability

For its 30 European members (plus Canada and the US), NATO is the bedrock of collective defense, based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The alliance offers:

• An integrated military command structure.

• Common standards that promote interoperability.

• A political framework for security cooperation.

In response to the changed security situation, NATO has significantly adjusted its stance. This includes:

• Strengthening its forward presence on the Eastern Flank with multinational battlegroups (now expandable to brigade size).

• Boosting readiness levels via the New Force Model (aiming for 300,000 troops at higher readiness).

• Developing robust new regional defense plans.

Burden-sharing within NATO remains an ongoing issue. The United States still pays for the vast majority of total NATO defense spending (around 68% in 2023) and provides critical strategic capabilities (ISR, strategic lift, high-end air defense, nuclear umbrella) that European allies heavily rely on. Although European allies and Canada have significantly increased their defense spending since the 2014 Wales Pledge (adding over $700 billion cumulatively by 2024), the debate over fair contributions continues, especially around the 2% GDP guideline and the 20% equipment investment target. Disagreements over how defense spending is defined also complicate assessments of fair burden-sharing. Worries about the reliability of the US security commitment, especially under potential future administrations, have added urgency to European efforts to boost their own capabilities, though mostly still within the NATO framework. NATO is crucial for ensuring allied forces can work together effectively through standardization agreements (STANAGs), joint exercises, and capability targets.

EU defense Integration: Ambitions, Tools (EDF, PESCO), and Limitations

The European Union has also stepped up its focus and ambition in defense, aiming to become a more capable security player and promote European strategic autonomy, generally seen as complementing NATO. The idea of a "European defense Union" has gained some traction, especially within the European Commission.

The EU uses several tools for its defense goals:

• The European defense Fund (EDF): Provides funding (approx. €8 billion for 2021-2027) to encourage collaborative defense R&D involving companies from multiple member states.

• Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): Offers a framework for groups of member states to jointly develop capabilities or conduct operations.

• The Coordinated Annual Review on defense (CARD): Aims to map the European capability landscape and spot gaps and cooperation opportunities.

• The European Peace Facility (EPF): An off-budget tool used to fund military operations and provide military aid to partners, notably Ukraine and recently Armenia.

• Proposals for a dedicated European defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and new regulations like SAFE aim to further streamline cooperation and strengthen the EDIB.

Despite these efforts, the EU's role in 'hard' security is still limited compared to NATO. Its defense initiatives have relatively small budgets compared to overall national defense spending. The effectiveness of EU tools really depends on the political will and financial commitment of individual member states, who often put national interests and industries first. Concerns about duplicating efforts with NATO structures also linger. While the EU is becoming more important in fostering defense industrial cooperation and tackling specific capability gaps (like military mobility), it isn't set up to replace NATO as the main guarantor of collective defense for its members. To achieve the EU's stated goals would require much more funding – possibly an extra €500 billion in defense investment over the next decade, according to Commission estimates – and a greater willingness among members to pool resources and sovereignty.

Bilateral and Multilateral defense Cooperation

Beyond the big institutions of NATO and the EU, a dense network of bilateral (two-country) and minilateral (small group) defense relationships also shapes European security cooperation.

• Long-standing partnerships like the Franco-British one (Lancaster House Treaties) enable joint exercises, capability development (e.g., cruise missiles), and operational coordination.

• Franco-German cooperation, central to European integration, has faced difficulties in major defense projects like FCAS and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS).

• Other important groups include the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany, Poland) for strategic talks, Nordic defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) (including Nordic/Baltic states), and the Visegrad Group (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia).

• Specific bilateral deals are also key, like Germany's close defense ties with the Netherlands, France's support for Armenia and Moldova, and the recently revived UK-Germany defense cooperation (Trinity House agreement).

These smaller, often more flexible arrangements allow for focused cooperation on specific capabilities, regional challenges, or industrial projects, adding to the broader efforts within NATO and the EU. This layered approach reflects the complexity of European defense, where security is built through a mix of large alliances, evolving EU structures, and practical bilateral and regional partnerships.

IX. Trajectory and Challenges for European defense

The European defense scene in the mid-2020s is undergoing a major, though uneven, transformation. Driven by the return of major war to the continent and shifting global politics, European nations are investing in their militaries at levels not seen for decades. defense budgets have soared, modernization programs are speeding up, and commitment to collective defense, especially within NATO, has notably increased. The clear direction is towards a more militarily capable Europe. Investments in advanced systems like the F-35, modern armoured vehicles, better air defenses, and next-gen tech show a commitment to improving technology and interoperability. Increased spending allows for partially reversing post-Cold War cuts and starting to rebuild depleted stockpiles and improve readiness. The EU's growing role in boosting defense industrial cooperation also holds potential for more efficiency and capability development in the long run.

However, this positive trend is balanced by persistent, significant challenges that slow down the pace and limit the ultimate scope of Europe's military revival.

• Funding Sustainability: The rapid budget hikes since 2022 were mostly reactive. Keeping these higher spending levels (2% of GDP or maybe more) long-term will be tough amidst other demands on public money (healthcare, climate change, social welfare) and potential economic problems. Stable, predictable, multi-year funding is vital for both military planning and industry confidence.

• Personnel Deficits: Perhaps the biggest constraint is manpower. Even with more spending, many European nations struggle to recruit and retain enough people, leading to shrinking or stagnant forces. This hits readiness, the ability to use new equipment effectively, and the capacity to meet NATO's demanding force requirements. Fixing this means tackling deep-rooted demographic, economic, and societal issues.

• Industrial Capacity and Procurement Efficiency: Turning bigger budgets into actual delivered capability is still a bottleneck. European defense industries struggle to rapidly increase production due to supply chain issues, skilled worker shortages, and the legacy of market fragmentation. National procurement processes are often slow and bureaucratic, delaying vital equipment getting to the troops. More cooperation and consolidation could boost efficiency, but overcoming national protectionism is hard.

• Political Will and Strategic Coherence: While there's agreement on needing stronger defense, turning this into consistent, collaborative action, especially at the EU level, remains difficult. National interests often win out over collective efficiency. Achieving real European strategic autonomy needs a level of political integration and shared strategic thinking that's still developing.

• Transatlantic Dependence and Uncertainty: Europe still heavily relies on the United States for critical strategic support and the ultimate security guarantee via NATO's Article 5. Uncertainty about future US foreign policy and its commitment to European security adds complexity and urgency to Europe's own defense efforts. This pushes allies to take on more responsibility while managing the essential transatlantic relationship.

Europe is actively rearming and adapting to a more dangerous world. Real progress has been made in boosting defense investment and starting modernization. However, the continent faces huge challenges in getting enough trained personnel, increasing industrial output, ensuring long-term financial commitment, and achieving better strategic coherence. Overcoming these hurdles will demand sustained political will, tough choices about resources, deeper cooperation among European nations, and careful handling of the vital transatlantic link.