China's Overseas Military Footprint: Strategic Bases and Global Reach
China's Overseas Military Footprint: Strategic Bases and Global Reach
I. Introduction: China's Global Reach
The international security landscape is witnessing a profound transformation, marked significantly by the evolving strategic posture of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Historically, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) maintained a focus predominantly centered on territorial defense, regional contingencies, particularly concerning Taiwan, and securing its immediate periphery. However, the 21st century has ushered in a new era characterized by China's ascent as a premier global economic power and its accompanying ambition to project military influence far beyond its shores. This shift manifests most tangibly in the PLA's burgeoning network of overseas military bases, access points, and strategic installations – a development signaling a departure from its traditional continental mindset towards embracing the role of a maritime and global power.
While the United States possesses a vast and long-established global network of military bases, numbering 24 persistent sites and access to 20 others in the Indo-Pacific alone, China's overseas military footprint remains comparatively nascent. Officially, Beijing acknowledges only one overseas military base, located in Djibouti. Yet, this single acknowledged base, coupled with a growing number of credibly reported dual-use facilities, intelligence outposts, and strategic access agreements across the globe, represents a strategically significant and rapidly expanding capability. This expansion is inextricably linked to China's economic rise, particularly its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure and investment program spanning continents. Beijing explicitly frames its growing overseas military presence as necessary for safeguarding its expanding global interests, including the security of its citizens abroad, protection of vital investments, and ensuring the safety of critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) – justifications codified in its national security legislation and defense white papers. The dramatic growth in the size and expeditionary capabilities of the PLA Navy (PLAN), now the world's largest by number of hulls and projected to reach 435 ships by 2030, serves as both a driver and an enabler of this outward push.
A key element facilitating this expansion is China's adept use of strategic ambiguity. Official discourse frequently employs euphemisms, labeling facilities with clear military potential as "support facilities" or "logistics hubs". This approach, sometimes described by scholars using the phrase "first civilian, then military" (先民后军), involves initially emphasizing commercial purposes for infrastructure projects, particularly ports developed under the BRI umbrella, only to later leverage them for military support. This pattern is observable not only in Djibouti but also in potential access arrangements being developed or sought in locations like Gwadar, Pakistan, Ream, Cambodia, Khalifa Port in the UAE, and potentially Bata in Equatorial Guinea. Such ambiguity allows Beijing to gradually expand its military reach while attempting to minimize immediate geopolitical friction and providing less clear targets for countermeasures by competitors like the United States.
Underpinning this strategy is the state-directed concept of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF), which mandates the leveraging of civilian resources and infrastructure for military objectives. The development of dual-use infrastructure, especially ports connected to the BRI, is a prime example of MCF in practice overseas. Major Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such as the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) and the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), which are frequently involved in constructing and operating these overseas ports (e.g., Gwadar, Khalifa, Ream), maintain close ties with the PLA and are expected to support national security goals. This integrated approach enables China to establish a global network of potential logistics hubs and access points, enhancing its power projection capabilities without incurring the political and financial costs associated with establishing a large number of overt, formal military bases comparable to the US model.
This report provides a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the known and credibly reported network of Chinese military bases, dual-use facilities, intelligence outposts, and other strategic installations located outside mainland China. It examines the specific characteristics, capabilities, strategic rationale, and geopolitical implications of each significant location, drawing upon open-source information, including satellite imagery analysis, government documents such as the U.S. Department of Defense's annual China Military Power Report, research from think tanks like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Lowy Institute, the Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, the RAND Corporation, and the United States Institute of Peace, alongside academic studies and credible media reporting, particularly from outlets like the Wall Street Journal. The analysis acknowledges and incorporates official denials and existing controversies surrounding these facilities, aiming to present a balanced and evidence-based assessment of China's expanding global military footprint.
II. Djibouti: The First Base
The formal inauguration of the People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti on August 1, 2017, marked a watershed moment in China's military history. It represented the PLA's first-ever overseas military installation, a tangible symbol of Beijing's evolving strategic ambitions and its growing capacity to project power far beyond its borders. Situated in the strategically vital Horn of Africa, adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait – a critical maritime chokepoint connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden through which vast amounts of global trade and energy supplies transit daily – the base's location underscores its significance. China transports goods worth an estimated $1 billion to Europe through this strait every day, and a significant portion of its vital Middle Eastern oil imports traverse these waters.
Beijing offered several justifications for establishing the base, built at a reported cost of $590 million. Primarily, it was presented as a logistics facility to support the PLAN's ongoing participation in international anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, a mission China has contributed to since 2008. Other stated purposes include providing logistical support for Chinese troops participating in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, facilitating humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, and enabling non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs). China cited its experiences evacuating tens of thousands of its citizens from Libya in 2011 and hundreds from Yemen in 2015 as key drivers for seeking a more permanent regional presence to ensure the safety of its nationals abroad, consistent with its 2015 National Security Law. The initial lease agreement with Djibouti was reported as a 10-year contract with an annual rent of $20 million, though some sources suggest a longer potential duration.
Despite China's preference for the term "support facility", the installation possesses capabilities far exceeding a simple logistics hub. The heavily fortified compound occupies approximately 0.5 square kilometers (0.2 sq mi) and is designed to house between 1,000 and 2,000 personnel. It features substantial infrastructure, including barracks, administrative buildings, a hospital, extensive underground facilities covering 23,000 square meters, helicopter aprons, and a 400-meter runway complete with an air traffic control tower. Perhaps the most significant development was the construction of a large naval pier, over 330 meters (1,120 feet) long, completed around December 2019. This pier is capable of accommodating the PLAN's largest warships, including its aircraft carriers and potentially up to four nuclear-powered submarines simultaneously. This expansion reflects a considerable evolution from the base's initial conception as merely a "logistics facility" to a major naval outpost.
The base's functions, both actual and potential, extend well beyond its publicly stated mission set. It significantly enhances China's power projection capabilities into the strategically crucial Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf regions. Its location, merely miles from Camp Lemonnier (the primary US base in Africa) and in close proximity to French, Japanese, and Italian military installations, makes it an ideal platform for intelligence collection, including signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) targeting foreign military activities. Furthermore, the base serves as a vital node for securing China's strategic energy supply channels originating from the Middle East. Chinese military scholars have referred to the Djibouti base as a "strategic strongpoint" (战略支点), highlighting its role in securing critical trade routes and furthering Beijing's geopolitical aims.
Djibouti itself has pursued a strategy of leveraging its geostrategic position to generate revenue by hosting multiple foreign military bases. While this provides income, it also creates a complex security environment with potential for friction between the various foreign forces operating in close proximity. Moreover, the significant Chinese investment, while bringing development, also raises concerns about Djibouti's potential economic dependence and debt burden, which could impact its future foreign policy autonomy.
The establishment and subsequent expansion of the Djibouti base offer crucial insights into China's approach to overseas military presence. It functions not only as an operational hub but also as a critical learning environment for the PLA. As China's first venture into establishing and operating a military facility on foreign soil, Djibouti provides invaluable experience in managing expeditionary logistics, developing operational procedures for far-seas deployments, implementing force protection measures in a complex environment, and navigating the political intricacies of host-nation relations. The base's evolution from its initial "logistics facility" description to its current state with robust naval infrastructure suggests a process of adaptation based on operational needs and growing strategic confidence. The lessons learned in Djibouti – both successes and challenges – are undoubtedly shaping China's methodology for negotiating access, constructing facilities, and managing relationships in other potential overseas locations, potentially serving as a template for future endeavors.
Furthermore, China's persistent use of the term "support facility" instead of "military base," despite the installation's evident military capabilities, highlights a deliberate semantic strategy. This linguistic choice aims to downplay the power projection aspects of the base and differentiate China's approach rhetorically from that of established Western powers, aligning with Beijing's broader narrative of peaceful development and non-interference. However, the substantial military infrastructure – fortifications, personnel capacity, aircraft carrier-capable pier, underground bunkers – clearly enables operations far beyond simple logistical support, facilitating sustained power projection and intelligence gathering. This noticeable gap between official rhetoric and operational reality is a recurring characteristic of China's expanding overseas presence, complicating efforts by other nations to accurately assess Beijing's intentions and capabilities.
III. Cambodia: Ream Naval Base
Situated on Cambodia's southwestern coast along the Gulf of Thailand, Ream Naval Base has emerged as a significant focal point of geopolitical attention and controversy. Historically an underdeveloped facility, despite being the Royal Cambodian Navy's (RCN) primary base with direct sea access, Ream was thrust into the international spotlight in July 2019. The Wall Street Journal published a report, citing unnamed U.S. officials who claimed to have seen early drafts, alleging that Cambodia had signed a secret agreement granting China exclusive military access to a portion of the base for 30 years, with automatic renewals.
The Cambodian government, under both former Prime Minister Hun Sen and his successor Hun Manet, has consistently and vehemently denied these reports, frequently invoking the country's constitution, which explicitly forbids the hosting of foreign military bases on its soil. However, suspicions were significantly fueled by Cambodia's actions surrounding the base upgrades. In 2020, Cambodia demolished U.S.-funded facilities at Ream, including a maritime security headquarters and a boat maintenance facility, shortly after initially requesting and then abruptly rejecting U.S. funding for their repair. Cambodian officials stated the structures were being relocated, but the move coincided with admissions that China would be funding major upgrades to the base.
Since 2022, China has indeed funded and overseen extensive construction and modernization efforts at Ream, undertaken by Chinese firms like the China Metallurgical Group Corporation. Satellite imagery has documented a rapid transformation of the base. Major upgrades include the construction of new piers designed to accommodate larger warships (such as the Type 056 corvettes China has supplied or may supply to Cambodia), significant dredging to deepen the harbor's access channels from 2-3 meters to 8-11 meters, a new command and control center to enhance maritime domain awareness, radar facilities for air and sea surveillance, and potentially air defense systems. Additional construction includes large dockyards, a drydock facility for ship maintenance, warehouses, administrative buildings, and living quarters. The pace and scale of this Chinese-funded construction, coupled with a perceived lack of transparency from Phnom Penh, have continued to fuel concerns in Washington and other regional capitals.
These concerns intensified significantly between December 2023 and early 2024 when two PLAN warships, identified as corvettes, docked at Ream's newly constructed pier for an extended period exceeding four months. Analysis of satellite imagery indicated that these were the only vessels to use the new, larger pier during this time; Cambodian naval assets continued using the older, smaller piers, and even a visiting Japanese naval contingent in February 2024 was directed to the civilian port of Sihanoukville rather than Ream. This extended and seemingly exclusive access granted to the PLAN warships appeared to contradict Cambodian assurances that the upgraded base would be open to all friendly navies. Cambodian officials later stated that the two PLAN corvettes were intended for transfer to the RCN, but the prolonged, exclusive presence served as a visible sign of privileged Chinese access.
Strategically, a Chinese military foothold at Ream, whether permanent or rotational, offers Beijing significant advantages. It provides a presence in the Gulf of Thailand, enhances its operational reach into Southeast Asia, places it closer to vital SLOCs passing through the region, and potentially facilitates intelligence gathering on neighboring countries, particularly Vietnam, and on maritime activities in the South China Sea. This prospect has generated considerable unease among the United States, Australia, India, Japan, and Vietnam. Cambodia's motivations appear rooted in a desire to modernize its relatively weak navy, address perceived security vulnerabilities relative to its larger neighbors Thailand and Vietnam, and secure economic and developmental benefits associated with its close relationship with China, its largest aid and investment partner. The developments at Ream also raise questions about the coherence and centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in managing regional security dynamics, potentially exacerbating existing fault lines within the bloc regarding China's influence.
The situation at Ream presents a distinct paradox concerning sovereignty. The Cambodian government adamantly maintains its constitutional line against foreign bases and exclusive access, emphasizing national ownership and control. Yet, the observable facts on the ground – the demolition of facilities built by a previous partner (the US), the acceptance of massive Chinese funding and construction for upgrades, the reported secret agreement granting long-term rights (seen by US officials), and the months-long exclusive berthing of PLAN warships at the new pier – collectively suggest a significant practical compromise of sovereignty. While Cambodia retains nominal ownership, China appears to have secured de facto preferential access and operational privileges that function similarly to exclusivity, likely achieved through opaque understandings or agreements beyond public view. This highlights the inherent difficulty in assessing the true nature of China's overseas access arrangements based solely on official pronouncements, revealing a potential gap between declared policy and operational reality.
Furthermore, the Ream controversy serves as a significant test case for ASEAN's internal cohesion and its principle of centrality in the regional security architecture. China's deepening military ties with Cambodia, a member state, inevitably raise concerns among other ASEAN members, particularly those with their own maritime disputes or security concerns involving China, such as Vietnam. A perceived permanent or exclusive Chinese military presence within ASEAN territory could undermine the bloc's efforts to present a unified front, potentially pressure smaller states, and challenge ASEAN's consensus-based approach to regional security issues. Cambodia's strong alignment with Beijing, often described as an "ironclad friendship", has in the past led it to obstruct ASEAN consensus on matters sensitive to China. The developments at Ream, therefore, transcend bilateral relations and represent a stress test for the effectiveness and unity of the regional organization in the face of intensifying great power competition.
IV. Pakistan: Gwadar Port
Gwadar Port, situated on Pakistan's Makran coast in the province of Balochistan, holds a position of immense strategic importance, lying in close proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, the world's most critical chokepoint for maritime oil transport. Once a collection of small fishing villages, Gwadar has been transformed into a deep-water port, largely through Chinese investment and construction, positioning it as a linchpin of the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC, itself a flagship project of China's overarching Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aims to connect Kashgar in China's western Xinjiang province with Gwadar, providing China with a direct land-sea route to the Arabian Sea and bypassing the longer maritime route through the Malacca Strait.
The development of Gwadar is deeply embedded within the context of the exceptionally close "all-weather friendship" between China and Pakistan. This relationship encompasses extensive military cooperation, including significant arms transfers from China to Pakistan, collaboration on defense production, and joint military exercises. Chinese state-owned enterprises, notably the China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC), a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), have played a central role in Gwadar's development and operation.
Despite being promoted primarily as a commercial venture intended to boost regional trade and connectivity, Gwadar Port has faced significant challenges. Security remains a major concern, with threats posed by Baloch nationalist insurgents who resent the project and have targeted Chinese personnel and interests. Furthermore, analysts have pointed to the port's underwhelming commercial performance to date, questioning its economic viability as a major transshipment hub and suggesting it may not even be the most desirable port location within Pakistan from a purely commercial standpoint.
This apparent disconnect between the massive investment poured into Gwadar and its limited commercial success has fueled widespread speculation, particularly within regional and international security circles, that the port's primary strategic value for China may be military rather than economic. Numerous analysts and reports assess Gwadar as being intended for dual-use purposes, potentially serving as a crucial overseas logistics and maintenance hub for the PLAN in the Indian Ocean. Its strategic location offers the PLAN potential access near the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, significantly enhancing its ability to sustain naval deployments in the region. The concept of "strategic strongpoints" (战略支点), used by Chinese analysts to describe strategically valuable foreign ports with Chinese involvement, has been specifically applied to Gwadar. Research institutions like the RAND Corporation have identified Pakistan as a highly desirable and feasible candidate for hosting a future Chinese naval base, and there are concerns that China could covertly pre-position military equipment or establish intelligence-gathering capabilities at the port under the cover of commercial operations. While some analysis suggests Gwadar might not be the PLAN's preferred choice compared to other existing Pakistani naval facilities along the Makran Coast, China's significant leverage over Pakistan makes access highly probable if sought.
The prospect of a Chinese naval presence at Gwadar is viewed with significant alarm by India. New Delhi strongly opposes CPEC on the grounds that its route passes through territory in Kashmir that India claims. The potential militarization of Gwadar is seen as a key component of China's perceived "String of Pearls" strategy – a network of ports and facilities across the Indian Ocean littoral that India fears is designed to strategically encircle it.
The persistent gap between Gwadar's touted economic potential and its actual commercial performance lends considerable credence to the assessment that its primary importance for Beijing lies in its strategic location and potential military utility. The substantial and ongoing Chinese investment, despite commercial underperformance and significant security risks, strongly suggests that geopolitical and military considerations are paramount. The narrative emphasizing economic development, while potentially genuine in part, likely also serves as a convenient justification and cover for securing a vital strategic foothold in the northern Indian Ocean, consistent with China's broader Military-Civil Fusion doctrine and its pattern of developing dual-use infrastructure globally.
Crucially, the potential for PLAN access to Gwadar cannot be divorced from the exceptionally deep and continuously strengthening military partnership between China and Pakistan. This relationship, characterized by extensive arms transfers, increasingly complex joint military exercises, and growing interoperability, is evolving towards what some analysts term a "threshold alliance" – a state short of a formal treaty but indicative of advanced coordination and potential shared wartime capabilities. Notably, there appears to be significant support within Pakistan's own strategic community for granting China basing rights. Given this deep alignment and China's considerable political and economic influence in Islamabad, the political and military obstacles to securing reliable, long-term PLAN access to Gwadar appear surmountable and are likely diminishing over time, making it one of the most plausible locations for a future Chinese naval outpost in the Indian Ocean.
V. Space and SIGINT Facilities
Beyond establishing naval access points, China is actively expanding its overseas footprint in the domains of space tracking and signals intelligence (SIGINT), establishing sophisticated facilities in strategically chosen locations that offer unique geographical advantages for monitoring adversaries and supporting its own military and space operations.
A. Argentina: Patagonia Space Station
Deep within the sparsely populated Patagonian region of Argentina's Neuquén province lies the Espacio Lejano Station, a significant Chinese deep space tracking facility that commenced operations around 2018. The station's primary visible infrastructure includes large, steerable parabolic antennas, notably one 35 meters in diameter and another 13.5 meters, alongside support buildings, lodging for personnel, and a dedicated power plant. Officially, its purpose is scientific: supporting China's ambitious lunar and interplanetary exploration programs, such as the Chang'e lunar missions, and conducting astronomical observation.
However, the facility has been shrouded in controversy since its inception, primarily due to the nature of its operator and the terms of the agreement under which it was established. The station is operated not by a civilian scientific agency, but by the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC), an entity explicitly subordinate to the PLA's Strategic Support Force. The agreement, negotiated and signed between 2012 and 2014 under the Peronist government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, granted China a 50-year lease on approximately 200 hectares (nearly 500 acres) of Argentine territory. Critically, the deal included highly favorable terms for China: extensive tax exemptions (including VAT, customs duties, and other taxes for the entire 50-year duration), simplified entry for Chinese personnel working under Chinese labor law, and, most controversially, clauses stipulating that Argentina should "not interfere or interrupt" the station's activities and granting China effective control over operations on site. Argentine access is limited, contractually guaranteed only 10 percent of the antenna's operational time (roughly two hours and forty minutes per day). The negotiation process was reportedly secretive, coinciding with a period when Argentina, facing exclusion from international credit markets, received significant financial assistance from China, including currency swaps, leading to speculation about quid pro quo arrangements.
These factors have fueled persistent concerns, particularly in the United States, about the station's potential dual military use. Its powerful antennas and strategic location in the Southern Hemisphere could theoretically be employed for SIGINT collection, monitoring and potentially interfering with satellites (including those of the US and its allies), tracking missile launches, and gathering other forms of electronic intelligence. Successive commanders of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) have publicly voiced concerns that the station enhances the PLA's global space tracking and surveillance capabilities, potentially supporting the targeting of U.S. forces. While the subsequent Argentine government under Mauricio Macri secured an amendment in 2016 explicitly prohibiting military use, the lack of robust Argentine physical oversight or independent verification mechanisms makes compliance difficult to confirm. Recent Argentine administrations, including that of Javier Milei, have expressed interest in conducting inspections to ensure adherence to the agreement amid ongoing US pressure.
The Patagonia station serves as a compelling example of how China utilizes ostensibly civilian scientific and space cooperation initiatives as a vehicle for establishing strategically positioned, long-term infrastructure with significant potential for military intelligence and space warfare applications. By embedding these capabilities within a framework of scientific partnership, and securing advantageous, often opaque agreements with host nations seeking economic or financial benefits, Beijing can advance its strategic objectives while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The secrecy surrounding the original agreement and the deliberate limitations placed on host-nation oversight appear to be integral features of this approach, maximizing China's operational autonomy and hindering external verification of the station's adherence to its stated peaceful purposes. This lack of transparency inherently increases the strategic risk associated with the facility.
B. Cuba: SIGINT Facilities
Cuba's strategic location, less than 100 miles from the coast of Florida, has long made it a prime spot for intelligence gathering directed at the United States. While Soviet/Russian intelligence operations on the island are well-documented, recent years have seen growing evidence and official U.S. confirmation of a significant and expanding Chinese SIGINT presence. In June 2023, Biden administration officials acknowledged that China operates signals intelligence collection facilities in Cuba, with later reports suggesting as many as four sites of concern and upgrades occurring since at least 2019.
Analysis by CSIS, utilizing satellite imagery and open-source information, has identified four specific locations in Cuba deemed most likely to be supporting Chinese intelligence efforts:
Bejucal: Located south of Havana, this site is considered the largest and most significant active SIGINT facility reviewed. It has historical military importance, having housed Soviet nuclear missiles during the 1962 crisis, and has been linked to suspected Chinese intelligence activity for years, including by Senator Marco Rubio in 2016. Satellite imagery confirms ongoing activity and significant upgrades over the past decade, including the installation of various antenna types (dish antennas for satellite communications, arrays for high-frequency signals) and a prominent radome concealing equipment optimized for SIGINT collection, potentially radar or electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems. Its capabilities likely include intercepting satellite downlinks and tracking U.S. space launches from Florida. Unconfirmed reports suggest it may house Cuban military intelligence units.
Wajay: Also near Havana, this facility has expanded considerably since its establishment around 2002. Once consisting of a single antenna, it now boasts a complex of a dozen antennas of various sizes, support buildings, and a solar farm. The absence of large dish antennas suggests a primary focus on intercepting terrestrial signals rather than satellite communications. Rumors persist about Chinese involvement in its construction or modernization.
El Salao: Situated in eastern Cuba, relatively close to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, this is the newest facility identified, with construction beginning in 2021. Its most prominent feature appears to be a large Circularly Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA), a type of antenna highly effective for long-range signal interception and direction finding, commonly used during the Cold War. Once operational, this CDAA would significantly enhance capabilities for monitoring air and maritime activity throughout the Caribbean region.
Calabazar: This site, also near Havana, has not been publicly linked to Chinese operations previously, unlike Bejucal. However, its characteristics suggest a role in intelligence collection, and it could potentially be utilized by or provide support to Chinese efforts as part of Cuba's broader intelligence infrastructure.
The collective capabilities suggested by these facilities point towards a comprehensive intelligence-gathering effort. Objectives likely include monitoring sensitive U.S. military communications (naval, air, and potentially base communications emanating from the southeastern US), tracking U.S. military and civilian satellite activities, surveilling maritime traffic and military exercises in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, and potentially supporting PLA global operations, including telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) for Chinese satellites. There is also speculation about potential intelligence sharing or cooperation between China and Russia at these Cuban sites. The U.S. intelligence community, including in its annual threat assessments, has explicitly warned about China's pursuit of military facilities in Cuba. Both Beijing and Havana, however, consistently deny the existence of Chinese spy bases on the island.
China's strategy in Cuba appears to involve skillfully leveraging existing infrastructure and historical relationships. By potentially utilizing or upgrading sites with Soviet-era intelligence legacies, like Bejucal, and capitalizing on Cuba's long-standing adversarial posture towards the United States, Beijing can establish a sophisticated SIGINT presence relatively quickly and perhaps more discreetly than building entirely new facilities in less politically aligned nations. The established intelligence apparatus in Cuba, possibly including cooperation with remaining Russian elements, provides a foundation upon which China can build.
Furthermore, the existence of multiple distinct sites (Bejucal, Wajay, El Salao, Calabazar) equipped with different types of antenna systems (dishes, CDAA, terrestrial arrays) strongly suggests a coordinated, multi-layered intelligence collection architecture. This is not merely an opportunistic single facility but likely a networked system designed to capture a broad spectrum of signals – satellite, high-frequency, terrestrial – across a wide geographic area encompassing the southeastern United States and critical Caribbean waterways. This multi-site approach provides redundancy, specialized capabilities, and more comprehensive coverage than any single location could achieve alone.
VI. Other Reported Sites
Beyond the established base in Djibouti and the highly scrutinized activities in Cambodia, Pakistan, Argentina, and Cuba, China's pursuit of overseas military access and presence extends to several other strategically significant regions, often involving complex interactions with host nations and eliciting strong reactions from the United States and regional powers.
A. UAE: Khalifa Port
The United Arab Emirates, a key U.S. security partner in the Persian Gulf, has also become a focal point for concerns regarding potential Chinese military encroachment. China has established a substantial commercial presence at Khalifa Port, strategically located near Abu Dhabi. Notably, the Chinese shipping giant COSCO secured a $738 million agreement in 2016 for a container terminal, which included a 35-year deal granting China exclusive rights to design, construct, and manage the facility. More recently, in October 2022, China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) won a bid to further expand the port's container yard and support infrastructure. These investments are part of China's broader effort to deepen economic ties with Gulf nations through the BRI, linking its initiatives with the region's own development plans. PLAN vessels have also made port calls at Khalifa, including a five-day visit by a three-ship task force in January 2020, framed as support for ongoing anti-piracy missions but also serving military diplomacy goals.
This significant commercial footprint became the center of a major controversy in 2021. U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly detected clandestine construction activity at Khalifa Port, suspecting China was secretly building a military facility. According to reports, Washington exerted considerable diplomatic pressure on the Emirati government, warning that a Chinese military presence could jeopardize the close U.S.-UAE security relationship, including a planned multi-billion dollar sale of F-35 fighter jets and Reaper drones. Emirati officials reportedly stated they were unaware of the military nature of the construction, and following U.S. interventions, work on the suspected facility appeared to halt.
However, the issue resurfaced in April 2023, with leaked U.S. intelligence documents suggesting that construction activities at the suspected Chinese military site had resumed in late 2022. This was corroborated by Emirati military sources speaking to media outlets, who also noted unusual restrictions on access for non-Chinese personnel within the COSCO-operated container terminal area, fueling concerns about espionage and the use of legitimate commercial operations as camouflage for military or intelligence activities. The U.S. Department of Defense has previously listed the UAE as a country where the PLA has considered establishing military facilities. While some Emirati analysts suggest China is more likely pursuing a security monitoring or intelligence center rather than a traditional base, the potential for dual-use exploitation of the port infrastructure remains a significant concern.
The events surrounding Khalifa Port underscore China's persistence in seeking strategic footholds even within nations closely aligned with the United States. It represents a direct probe of U.S. influence in the Gulf and a test of Washington's ability to prevent the establishment of facilities that could threaten its regional interests and those of its partners. The reported resumption of activity after an initial pause suggests that diplomatic pressure alone may not be sufficient to deter Beijing permanently, forcing the U.S. into a mode of continuous vigilance and diplomatic engagement. Furthermore, the Khalifa case exemplifies China's strategy of incremental encroachment through dual-use infrastructure. By securing long-term, exclusive control over significant commercial port facilities like the COSCO terminal, China creates a pre-existing platform. This platform can then be potentially leveraged for intelligence gathering or gradually militarized with greater ease and deniability compared to constructing a dedicated military base from the ground up. This incrementalism makes it challenging for observers to identify a definitive point of militarization and complicates potential response options.
B. Equatorial Guinea: Bata Port
Perhaps the most alarming prospect for U.S. strategic planners has been the potential establishment of a Chinese naval base on the Atlantic coast of Africa. In December 2021, The Wall Street Journal, citing classified U.S. intelligence, reported that China was actively pursuing an agreement with Equatorial Guinea to establish its first permanent military presence in the Atlantic Ocean, likely at the port city of Bata. This possibility triggered significant concern within the U.S. government, particularly at U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Then-AFRICOM commander, General Stephen Townsend, publicly identified a potential Chinese Atlantic base as his foremost worry in Africa, highlighting the threat it would pose to U.S. national security.
The strategic implications of such a base are profound. It would grant the PLAN the ability to rearm, refuel, and repair warships far from Chinese homeports, enabling sustained naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean. This would dramatically reduce the geographical distance and response-time advantages currently enjoyed by the United States in the Atlantic theater and potentially allow China to threaten vital transatlantic SLOCs. A permanent PLAN presence in the Atlantic would mark a significant expansion of China's military reach beyond the Indo-Pacific, signaling truly global power projection ambitions. China has cultivated a relationship with Equatorial Guinea spanning decades and has been involved in infrastructure projects, including upgrades to the port facilities at Bata, the country's largest city.
The United States responded proactively to the intelligence reports, dispatching high-level interagency delegations to Equatorial Guinea to express U.S. security concerns directly and attempt to dissuade the government from hosting a Chinese military facility. The government of Equatorial Guinea has publicly denied any plans for a Chinese base. While the immediate threat appears to have been forestalled, as there is no confirmation of active base construction, the U.S. remains vigilant. Reports have also surfaced suggesting China may be exploring similar basing possibilities in neighboring Gabon, indicating a persistent interest in securing an Atlantic foothold.
China's pursuit of access in Equatorial Guinea highlights a potential pattern of targeting strategically located nations governed by regimes that may be more amenable to opaque deals due to factors like authoritarian structures, economic vulnerability, or existing infrastructure dependencies created by Chinese investment. Equatorial Guinea has been ruled by the same family since 1979, and governance concerns, including corruption and lack of transparency, have been noted. Such environments may offer Beijing advantages in negotiating access agreements with less public scrutiny or domestic political opposition compared to more democratic states. This approach, leveraging infrastructure investments like the Bata port upgrades and potentially exploiting governance weaknesses, mirrors aspects observed in China's dealings elsewhere, suggesting a calculated strategy for securing strategic access points around the globe.
C. Tajikistan: Border Security
China has also established a notable military presence in Central Asia, specifically within Tajikistan, driven primarily by concerns emanating from neighboring Afghanistan and its own restive Xinjiang province. This presence, while often downplayed or denied by both governments, involves multiple facilities and deepening security cooperation.
Credible reports and satellite imagery analysis indicate the existence of at least one Chinese military outpost or facility operating for several years within Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), a mountainous area bordering Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor and China's Xinjiang. This facility, located near Murghob, appears suitable for a lightly armed unit, potentially battalion-sized, and includes infrastructure like heliports. Additionally, reports suggest China operates a radio monitoring site established over a decade ago, initially focused on Western activities in Afghanistan, and may have gained control over a former Soviet base near the tri-border area.
More recently, agreements have formalized aspects of this cooperation. In October 2021, Tajikistan approved the construction of a new base near the Afghan border, to be operated by Tajik special forces but fully financed by China's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) at a cost of $10 million. The involvement of the MPS, rather than the PLA directly, underscores the counter-terrorism and internal security focus of this particular project. China is also funding and constructing numerous border outposts and checkpoints along the Tajik-Afghan border for Tajik forces. Furthermore, the two countries have formalized arrangements for conducting joint anti-terrorism military exercises every two years.
The stated rationale for this Chinese presence consistently revolves around enhancing border security, preventing the spillover of instability and extremism from Afghanistan (particularly concerning groups like ISIS-K or ETIM potentially targeting Central Asia or Xinjiang), and combating terrorism and drug trafficking. Both Dushanbe and Beijing officially deny the existence of a formal Chinese military base on Tajik soil, preferring to frame the presence as cooperative security assistance and infrastructure support. This careful framing may also be intended to mitigate potential concerns within Tajikistan regarding national sovereignty and historical Chinese territorial claims in the Pamir region.
Strategically, China's activities in Tajikistan represent a significant extension of its security perimeter westward into Central Asia. This presence aims to create a buffer against instability emanating from Afghanistan that could threaten Xinjiang and disrupt BRI-related trade and infrastructure routes passing through the region. While Russia maintains a large military base in Tajikistan and historical influence, China's deepening security involvement and substantial economic leverage (Tajikistan is heavily indebted to China) suggest a gradual erosion of Moscow's traditional dominance in the country's security sphere. Some analysts note that China's success in establishing a presence contrasts with Moscow's unsuccessful attempts to have Russian border guards return to the Tajik-Afghan frontier.
The primary driver for China's military engagement in Tajikistan appears distinct from its naval basing ambitions elsewhere. It seems largely motivated by defensive, internal security concerns – specifically, protecting Xinjiang from external extremist threats originating in or transiting through Afghanistan. This represents an "export" of China's domestic security priorities and apparatus into a neighboring state, aiming to manage threats before they reach Chinese territory. The focus on border infrastructure and counter-terrorism cooperation, including the prominent role of the Ministry of Public Security, reinforces this interpretation.
Nevertheless, this growing security footprint inevitably impacts the regional balance of power. China's increasing military cooperation, infrastructure development, and economic dominance in Tajikistan represent a steady encroachment into Russia's traditional sphere of influence. While not necessarily a direct confrontation, Beijing's expanding role, facilitated by Dushanbe's economic dependencies, signals a quiet but significant shift in the geopolitical landscape of Central Asia, potentially displacing Russian primacy over time.
VII. Solomon Islands: Security Pact
In April 2022, the signing of a bilateral security cooperation agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Solomon Islands sent shockwaves across the Pacific region and drew intense scrutiny from the United States and its allies. Leaked drafts of the "Framework Agreement" revealed broad and vaguely defined provisions that caused significant alarm. Key clauses indicated that the Solomon Islands could request China to send "police, armed police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces" to assist in "maintaining social order, protecting people's lives and property, providing humanitarian assistance, carrying out disaster response, or providing assistance on other tasks agreed upon by the Parties". Crucially, the draft also stipulated that China could, with the consent of the Solomon Islands, "make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands," potentially providing a basis for regular PLA Navy presence. The agreement also included clauses on confidentiality and potential legal immunity for Chinese personnel.
The context for this agreement is complex, rooted in both domestic Solomon Islands politics and China's expanding influence. In September 2019, the government of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare made the controversial decision to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan (Republic of China) to the People's Republic of China. This move, undertaken despite significant domestic opposition, particularly from the premier of Malaita province, was justified by Sogavare on the grounds of anticipated economic benefits from Beijing. Beijing subsequently promised substantial financial aid. The switch exacerbated existing domestic tensions, culminating in violent riots in the capital, Honiara, in November 2021, during which Chinatown and Chinese-owned businesses were targeted. Following the riots, China offered anti-riot gear and dispatched police liaison officers to train Solomon Islands police. Prime Minister Sogavare framed the security pact with China as a necessary step to diversify the country's security partnerships and address the limitations of local police capabilities exposed by the unrest. From China's perspective, the pact aligned with its stated goal of protecting its citizens and significant investments abroad.
The revelation of the security pact elicited strong negative reactions from regional powers, particularly Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The primary concern was that the agreement could pave the way for the establishment of a permanent Chinese military base in the Solomon Islands, a nation occupying a strategically vital position in the South Pacific – a region of immense historical significance dating back to the pivotal battles of World War II, such as Guadalcanal. A permanent PLA presence there could significantly alter the regional security balance, potentially threaten key shipping lanes, and enable China to project power much further into the Pacific. While Prime Minister Sogavare publicly denied any intention of allowing a Chinese military base, the broad wording of the agreement left the possibility open. The pact spurred renewed diplomatic engagement from the U.S. and its allies, including the reopening of the U.S. embassy in Honiara after a 30-year absence and increased aid commitments.
Currently, while the security agreement remains in force, there has been no confirmed construction of a Chinese military base in the Solomon Islands. However, the pact provides a legal framework for potential future deployments and logistical support activities. The situation highlights the potential for an incremental expansion of Chinese security presence in the Pacific, posing an ongoing challenge to regional stability and the strategic interests of established powers.
The Solomon Islands security pact vividly illustrates China's capacity to capitalize on the internal vulnerabilities of smaller nations to achieve significant strategic gains. By leveraging a combination of factors – the political fallout from the diplomatic switch from Taiwan, the economic allure of Chinese aid and investment, and the genuine internal security challenges faced by the Sogavare government following the 2021 riots – Beijing secured an agreement that dramatically advanced its potential military reach into a strategically critical region. This occurred despite the Solomon Islands' traditional security ties with Australia and the broader alignment of the region with Western powers, demonstrating China's growing ability to reshape regional security dynamics.
Moreover, the agreement itself, even without leading immediately to a physical base, serves a crucial function in normalizing the presence of Chinese security personnel (police and potentially military) in the Pacific Islands. The deployment of Chinese police trainers and the provision of equipment following the riots established an initial precedent. The security pact codifies the potential for broader deployments and routine naval visits. This gradual familiarization process could lower regional resistance and sensitivities over time, potentially making it easier for China to negotiate more substantial access arrangements or even basing rights elsewhere in the Pacific in the future. It represents a subtle but significant shift in the regional security environment, establishing a foothold where none previously existed.
VIII. China's Strategy: Analysis
China's expanding network of overseas military and strategic installations is not a random collection of disparate facilities but reflects discernible patterns and underlying strategic motivations. Understanding these drivers and methods is crucial for assessing the trajectory and implications of Beijing's global power projection efforts.
Strategic Drivers:
The fundamental impetus behind China's push for overseas access stems from its transformation into a global economic power with worldwide interests. Key drivers include:
Protecting Global Interests: Safeguarding the security of a growing number of Chinese citizens living and working abroad, protecting massive overseas investments (particularly those under the BRI framework), and ensuring the security of vital SLOCs that transport energy resources and trade goods essential for China's economy.
Enabling Power Projection: Developing the logistical infrastructure necessary to sustain PLA operations, especially naval deployments, far from mainland China, thereby enhancing its ability to influence events in distant regions and respond to crises involving Chinese interests.
Enhancing Intelligence Gathering: Establishing platforms for collecting signals, electronic, and potentially human intelligence in strategically important areas to monitor adversaries, understand regional dynamics, and support military planning.
Challenging U.S. Dominance: Gradually eroding the uncontested global military primacy long enjoyed by the United States, competing for influence, and establishing itself as a credible global security actor.
Securing Resources: Protecting access to critical natural resources and energy supplies, particularly those transiting vulnerable maritime chokepoints.
Key Characteristics and Methods:
China employs a distinct set of methods in pursuing overseas access, often characterized by:
Focus on Strategic Geography: Targeting locations near critical maritime chokepoints (e.g., Bab el-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz), vital SLOCs, or areas of significant geopolitical competition.
Leveraging Commercial Infrastructure (Dual-Use): Extensively utilizing BRI investments, particularly in port construction and operation by Chinese SOEs, to create infrastructure that has inherent dual-use potential for military logistics, replenishment, and intelligence gathering.
Incrementalism ("First Civilian, Then Military"): Often adopting a gradual approach, starting with commercial investments or limited cooperative agreements and incrementally expanding the scope or potential military utility over time.
Strategic Ambiguity: Employing euphemistic language (e.g., "support facility" instead of "base") and emphasizing civilian or peaceful purposes to downplay military intentions and manage international perceptions.
Targeting Specific Needs/Vulnerabilities: Focusing on countries that have specific economic needs (seeking aid, investment, debt relief) or security concerns (internal instability, counter-terrorism) that China can offer to address in exchange for access or influence.
Opaque Agreements: Often negotiating agreements with limited transparency, potentially involving secret clauses or leveraging debt to secure favorable terms.
"Strategic Strongpoints" (战略支点): Conceptualizing key overseas ports and facilities as nodes in a network designed to support China's global reach and secure its interests.
Military-Civil Fusion (MCF):
The state strategy of MCF is central to China's overseas expansion. It institutionalizes the blurring of lines between civilian and military sectors, ensuring that commercial activities, particularly large infrastructure projects undertaken by SOEs abroad, are designed and implemented in ways that can also serve PLA requirements. This allows China to build a global logistics and support network under a commercial guise, leveraging its economic clout for strategic military advantage.
Comparison with U.S. Basing:
China's current overseas network is significantly smaller and structured differently than the extensive, decades-old U.S. global basing posture, which relies heavily on formal alliances and large, sovereign bases. China's approach emphasizes dual-use facilities and access agreements rather than numerous formal bases. PLA strategists themselves appear aware of the significant logistical challenges and vulnerabilities associated with establishing and defending traditional overseas military bases far from China, potentially contributing to this preference for a lighter, more flexible footprint, at least for now.
DoD Assessments and Future Projections:
The U.S. Department of Defense, in its annual reports on China's military power, consistently highlights Beijing's ambition to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to support global power projection. These reports identify numerous countries across Asia, Africa, and potentially Latin America where China is believed to be considering or pursuing military logistics facilities, including Cambodia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, UAE, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Angola. The overarching goal appears to be the creation of a global network capable of sustaining PLA operations worldwide, supported by the continued rapid expansion and modernization of the PLAN.
While China's pursuit of overseas access is clearly driven by overarching strategic goals like protecting its global interests and enhancing power projection, the specific acquisitions often appear opportunistic rather than rigidly planned. Beijing seems adept at identifying and exploiting windows of opportunity created by specific local conditions – be it a host nation's pressing economic needs (Argentina, Djibouti), internal security challenges (Solomon Islands, Tajikistan), existing deep political alignments (Pakistan), or geopolitical shifts. The diverse triggers and methods used across different locations – anti-piracy leading to Djibouti, CPEC enabling Gwadar, scientific cooperation facilitating the Patagonia station – suggest a flexible, adaptive strategy rather than adherence to a single, predetermined global blueprint. This opportunistic approach allows China to expand its footprint incrementally, reacting to favorable circumstances as they arise.
Furthermore, a central element of China's strategy appears to be securing reliable access to strategically located facilities, rather than necessarily establishing numerous large, sovereign military bases in the traditional sense. Many potential locations involve dual-use ports where Chinese companies hold significant operational control or investment stakes (e.g., Gwadar, Ream, Khalifa Port). Even the heavily militarized Djibouti facility is officially termed a "support facility", and agreements like the one with the Solomon Islands grant access rights that fall short of a formal base. This focus on access provides substantial logistical and operational benefits – enabling replenishment, maintenance, intelligence gathering, and limited power projection – while potentially incurring lower political costs and operational vulnerabilities compared to the U.S. model of large, permanent bases. This nuanced approach, prioritizing functional access over formal basing in many cases, presents a distinct challenge for competitor nations attempting to track and counter China's growing global military reach.
IX. Conclusion
The emergence and expansion of China's network of overseas military and strategic installations represent a defining characteristic of the contemporary international security environment. From the established naval support base in Djibouti to the contested access at Cambodia's Ream Naval Base, the potential dual-use facility at Pakistan's Gwadar Port, sophisticated space tracking and signals intelligence stations in Argentina and Cuba, and security-focused outposts in Tajikistan, Beijing is steadily building a global footprint to support its status as a major world power. This network, often developed under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative and facilitated by the doctrine of Military-Civil Fusion, utilizes a blend of commercial investments, strategic ambiguity, and opportunistic diplomacy to secure access to vital locations across the Indian Ocean, Pacific, Africa, Central Asia, and even the Western Hemisphere.
The strategic impact of this expanding network is multifaceted and significant. It undeniably enhances the PLA's capacity for sustained power projection, allowing its naval forces and potentially other military assets to operate effectively at greater distances from mainland China for longer durations. It expands China's global intelligence reach, providing platforms to monitor adversaries, track maritime and air traffic, and gather critical information in key strategic regions. This network is crucial for protecting China's burgeoning overseas economic interests, securing vital energy and trade routes, and ensuring the safety of its citizens abroad. Concurrently, it directly challenges the long-standing military dominance and political influence of the United States in critical waterways and regions, potentially altering regional security balances and compelling nations like India to reassess their own strategic postures and naval investments.
China's efforts to secure further overseas access points and potentially establish additional formal bases are likely to continue, driven by the same strategic imperatives that initiated the process. U.S. Department of Defense assessments consistently point to Beijing's ongoing search for new locations across multiple continents. The continued growth and modernization of the PLA, particularly the Navy, will necessitate an expanded logistical support network to sustain global operations. However, China will face persistent challenges. Host nations may become increasingly wary of compromising their sovereignty or becoming entangled in great power competition, potentially leading to greater pushback or demands for transparency. Concerns about debt sustainability linked to BRI projects could also complicate relationships. Furthermore, the United States and its allies are actively working to counter China's expansion through diplomatic pressure, offering alternative partnerships, and enhancing their own regional presence. Finally, operating and defending military facilities far from home presents inherent logistical and security vulnerabilities that the PLA must overcome.
China's pursuit of overseas bases and access points signifies more than just a quest for logistical convenience; it represents a deliberate effort to normalize the global presence of the PLA. By establishing footholds in diverse regions, Beijing aims to reshape international expectations, gradually eroding the perception of uncontested U.S. military dominance in many parts of the world and asserting China's role as a global security provider, at least for its own interests.
