North Korea's Geopolitical Landscape: 2024-2025

A Quick Look

Things certainly shifted for North Korea (DPRK) between 2024 and early 2025. We saw them cozying up strategically with Russia, taking a much harder, official line against South Korea, and pushing ahead with their forbidden weapons programs despite troubles at home. Human rights remain a serious worry, and their cyber operations are getting sharper.

Inside the country, Kim Jong Un seems firmly in charge, using what's happening outside North Korea to tighten his grip. A big move was ditching the idea of reunifying Korea and treating South Korea (ROK) as a separate, enemy state. They even changed their constitution and cut physical links between the North and South to reflect this. On the home front, they kicked off a "Regional Development 20x10 Policy" to address the economic gap between different parts of the country. Still, it looks like the rollout is limited and perhaps focused on areas important for defense.

Economically, North Korea is facing real headwinds. Word is that food prices are climbing and the currency is unstable, maybe partly because the government is trying to clamp down. International sanctions are still technically on the books, but with Russia vetoing the UN's monitoring group and China not enforcing things too strictly, they're losing their bite. China is still the main economic lifeline, but the partnership with Russia has grown significantly. Spurred by the war in Ukraine, North Korea and Russia now have a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, promising to defend each other. North Korea is sending a lot of military aid—munitions and soldiers—to Russia. In return, Russia sends food, fuel, possibly advanced tech, and provides diplomatic cover.

Developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles remains North Korea's top priority; they're not interested in giving them up. 2024 saw plenty of tests, especially of tactical nuclear delivery systems, hypersonic missiles, and solid-fuel ICBMs. Kim Jong Un made public appearances emphasizing nuclear expansion and touring production facilities. They're also working on a nuclear-powered submarine, which likely requires Russian help and could really boost their capabilities.

While still antagonistic towards the U.S., Pyongyang has hinted it might be willing to talk to a second Trump administration, probably hoping for a deal that eases sanctions and accepts their nuclear status. Relations with South Korea are at rock bottom, with hostility now official policy. Communication lines are dead, Seoul suspended the 2018 military agreement after provocations like "trash balloons" and GPS jamming, and border tensions remain high. South Korea's own political drama, with President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment, just adds another layer of unpredictability that could influence Pyongyang's moves in 2025.

The human rights picture is grim. Basic freedoms are crushed, forced labor is systemic, detention conditions are awful, and there's no accountability. Getting enough food is a major concern, worsened by state policies and border closures that also keep out international aid and monitors. North Korean refugees, particularly those in China, are at high risk of being sent back. Cyber operations are still a key tool for spying and raising cash, funding the weapons programs. They're using sophisticated tactics like ransomware and placing hidden IT workers in foreign companies, posing a complex global threat.

Looking to 2025, we can probably expect more military advances, continued hostility between the Koreas (though maybe shaped by politics in the South), a heavy reliance on Russia and China, and persistent human rights abuses. North Korea will likely keep using calculated provocations to build leverage for potential talks, especially with the U.S., while carefully balancing its reliance on Moscow and Beijing in a shaky region.

Inside North Korea

Leadership and Stability

Kim Jong Un remains the undisputed leader, directing policy and consolidating power. His central role is clear from his public appearances—launching parts of the regional development plan, inspecting nuclear sites, overseeing drills. The mood in 2024 was heavily influenced by preparations for potential military action, framed as readiness to subdue South Korea, and a deliberate hardening of relations. The regime's primary focus is survival and stability, cleverly using international shifts to its advantage. The deepening relationship with Russia, for instance, offers material benefits and diplomatic shielding. Meanwhile, the political turmoil in South Korea, culminating in President Yoon's impeachment, is likely viewed favorably in Pyongyang. Seoul's instability is seen as strengthening Kim's relative position and creating openings for the North. As the regime secures resources from Russia, it simultaneously capitalizes on South Korea's political weakness. This outward focus contrasts sharply with reports of severe economic problems at home, suggesting that focusing on foreign policy and external threats might be a way to both secure vital resources and distract the population from domestic hardships, reinforcing the narrative of a strong nation under siege.

Policy Shifts and Ideology

A major shift occurred in late 2023/early 2024 with the adoption of the "Two Hostile States" idea. This marked a radical departure from the long-held goal of national unification. Kim Jong Un declared reunification impossible, redefining the relationship as one between two separate, warring states. This apparently led to constitutional changes removing unification references and the dismantling of symbols related to inter-Korean cooperation, like the Arch of Unification. The reasons cited include rejecting Seoul's perceived "unification by absorption" policy, the widening power gap between the Koreas, a strategic calculation to leverage changing global dynamics ("new Cold War"), and a reaction to the Yoon administration's hardline stance.

The "Regional Development 20x10 Policy," launched in early 2024, aims to tackle the backward rural economy and regional wealth disparities. Initially, it involved building small factories in 20 chosen areas each year for a decade. Kim later expanded this to include health facilities, grain centers, and cultural complexes. However, plans for 2025 seem scaled back, focusing first on model hospitals before wider implementation. Furthermore, the initial locations chosen, like Kusong (home to military drone programs), suggest the policy might prioritize areas contributing to defense rather than simply the poorest regions.

The ongoing Five-Year Defense Development Plan (due to end in 2025) continues to drive military advancements. Finishing this plan, especially weapons development, will likely be Pyongyang's top focus in 2025, probably taking precedence over diplomacy. 2025 also marks the 80th anniversary of the Workers' Party, potentially prompting major military displays or announcements.

Underpinning all this is the unwavering commitment to nuclear status. Kim's publicized visits to nuclear facilities underscored the regime's dedication to strengthening its nuclear arsenal and rejecting denuclearization, a stance cemented in law. Introducing the "Two Hostile States" doctrine alongside the internal "20x10" development policy suggests a strategic realignment. By dropping the traditional unification narrative, the regime seems to be trying to build legitimacy based on internal progress and strength within a distinctly separate DPRK identity, possibly to manage discontent, even if the development policy proves selective.

Control and Information

The government maintains rigid control through sweeping restrictions and tight information management. Freedoms of expression, assembly, and access to information are virtually non-existent; all media is state-controlled. Accessing unapproved information or media—foreign TV, South Korean movies, music, websites—is illegal "anti-socialist behavior". Crackdowns are harsh; reports in 2024 mentioned severe sentences, like seven years of labor for borrowing an SD card with South Korean films. This clampdown on foreign culture seemed to intensify through 2024.

Contact with the outside world is heavily restricted, with phone signals jammed near the Chinese border. Communicating with people outside, even relatives, or helping others do so, can result in long prison terms. Movement is also controlled, requiring permission for travel between provinces or abroad. Border controls remain extremely tight; as of late 2024, guards reportedly still had orders (initially for COVID prevention) to shoot anyone crossing without permission.

Ideological control extends beyond borders. North Korean athletes at the Paris Olympics reportedly faced scrutiny upon return for taking viral selfies, showing the regime's sensitivity to any deviation from norms. The government clearly sees changing social attitudes, especially among youth attracted to individualism and outside information, as a challenge. This concern is likely one driver behind the "Two Hostile States" policy, aiming to sever cultural ties North Koreans might feel to the South. The simultaneous crackdown on foreign media and the push for the "Two Hostile States" doctrine highlight how the regime views external cultural influence as a direct threat to its security and ideology. Controlling information is thus vital for reinforcing the new national identity and the narrative of South Korea as solely an enemy.

The Economy: Sanctions, Trade, and Life Inside

Current Conditions and Challenges

Despite apparent gains on the international stage, particularly with Russia, North Korea's domestic economy reportedly took a nosedive in 2024. Reports suggest unprecedented hikes in food prices and foreign exchange rates in local markets. This seems counterintuitive given the inflow of resources like food and fuel from Russia, potentially alongside payments for munitions and troops sent to Ukraine.

Several factors might explain this disconnect. The state has ramped up efforts to control the economy, reversing some market-oriented reforms from the post-famine era. This includes tightening control over state trading companies and cracking down hard on black market currency trading to enforce an artificial official exchange rate. More state control over food supply and distribution, previously areas with semi-private activity, is likely adding to the economic strain and perhaps worsening food shortages.

Kim Jong Un himself has acknowledged the poor state of the rural economy and the wealth gap, ostensibly the reason for the "20x10" policy. Yet, core economic decision-making seems resistant to real change, and the policy's implementation looks limited and perhaps skewed towards regime priorities. An earlier economic strategy (2016-2020) already missed its targets.

Food security remains critical, exacerbated by prolonged COVID-related border closures that hit trade and blocked monitoring. State policies might even be making hunger worse. Escapee accounts describe widespread scarcity and hunger, with prison rations called minuscule and inedible.

The gap between resources flowing in from Russia and the deteriorating domestic economy suggests a deeply divided system. Benefits from international deals, especially the military trade with Russia, seem largely captured by the state and elites. These gains are likely earmarked for regime priorities like the military, not trickling down to stabilize markets or help the general populace. At the same time, intensified state controls over markets probably further disrupt the civilian economy.

The Shadow of Sanctions

An extensive web of international sanctions, mainly from the UN Security Council plus individual countries like the U.S., remains officially in effect. They aim to curb North Korea's WMD and missile programs by cutting off finance, trade, and income sources. The U.S. continued designating individuals and entities involved in illicit finance, procurement for missile programs, evasion networks (in places like the UAE and China), and those facilitating Russia-DPRK military/financial transfers.

However, the sanctions' real effectiveness is increasingly questionable. Russia and China, both with UN veto power, are widely seen as undermining enforcement. A major blow came in March 2024 when Russia vetoed the renewal of the UN Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions, effectively disbanding it. China abstained. Both Moscow and Beijing subsequently called for ending sanctions aimed at forcing negotiations. Russia is expected to push hard for sanctions relief in 2025.

North Korea itself employs sophisticated methods to get around sanctions. This includes using networks of agents and front companies, illicit IT work (where North Koreans embedded in foreign firms generate revenue), cyber theft targeting digital assets, and complex money laundering. Much of this activity relies on weak enforcement within China and access to its financial system.

Despite sanctions, official trade data shows some resilience. Trade with China, the main partner, reportedly neared pre-pandemic levels in 2023. While a slight dip was noted in 2024, overall cross-border flows seem to be recovering.

The breakdown in international consensus—especially Russia's obstruction and China's leniency—combined with North Korea's evasion skills, severely weakens sanctions as a tool to force denuclearization or change behavior. The system currently seems to lack the teeth and unity needed to effectively constrain Pyongyang's priorities: WMD advancement, military support, and elite sustenance. Sanctions appear increasingly symbolic rather than truly restrictive.

Trade Partners: Russia's Rise and China's Steady Hand

North Korea's external economic life revolves almost entirely around China and, increasingly, Russia.

• Russia: The Moscow-Pyongyang relationship dramatically intensified after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This culminated in a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" treaty signed during Putin's June 2024 Pyongyang visit, notably reviving a mutual defense clause reminiscent of their Cold War treaty. Shared strategic interests (countering the U.S.-led order) and wartime needs drive this partnership. North Korea has become a crucial supplier of conventional weapons (shells, missiles) to Russia and even reportedly sent troops (around 11,000) to Ukraine starting October 2024. In exchange, North Korea receives food, fuel, likely cash, diplomatic backing (like Russia's UN veto), and potentially critical advanced military tech, possibly aiding its nuclear, missile, and satellite programs. Much of this trade seems to be barter. Cooperation is expected to broaden in 2025, with Russia likely pushing for sanctions relief and investing in logistics. More North Korean laborers also went to Russia in 2024. While the relationship will likely outlast the Ukraine war, Russia might become more selective later and can't fully replace China as the primary benefactor.

• China: Despite Russia's increased profile, China remains North Korea's essential economic backstop. It's been the primary trade partner for years (over 95% of volume since 2018), providing a vital lifeline for regime stability. China is also the most likely source for any large-scale development aid. Beijing offers crucial diplomatic cover, generally opposing sanctions, and its lax enforcement allows North Korea to conduct illicit revenue generation, especially via the Chinese financial system. However, China has shown some wariness about the overt military aspects of the DPRK-Russia link. It abstained on the UN sanctions panel vote and maintained diplomatic channels with South Korea. High-level Chinese officials visited Pyongyang in 2024. A potential friction point could be competing interests over access to the sea via the Tumen River.

North Korea seems to be adeptly playing its two major patrons off against each other. It leverages Russia's immediate needs for military, tech, and diplomatic gains, while relying on China's long-term economic support for basic stability. This creates a complex triangle. China might be uneasy about the depth of the DPRK-Russia military ties and potential instability, but seems unwilling or unable to apply decisive pressure, likely due to its own rivalry with the U.S. and the value it places on North Korea as a buffer. This situation lets North Korea maneuver between its powerful neighbors to maximize benefits from both.